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Rebecca M. Bratspies∗ 
“Though this be madness, Yet there is method in ‘t.”1 
 
“The only thing on which all parties agree is that there is a 
need for us to arrive at an administratively manageable inter-
pretation of the insurance policies—one that can be applied with 
minimal need for litigation.”2 
 
In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility, 
Compensation and Liability Act3 (“CERCLA” or “Superfund”) 
won congressional approval by an overwhelming majority. 
CERCLA was to be the answer to the nation’s hazardous waste 
disposal problems. Not only would the new law clean up haz-
ardous waste sites, but, through retroactive strict liability,4 it 
 
∗ Research Instructor in Law, New York University School of Law. The author 
would like to express her gratitude to Juliana Reno, Judith Wise, and Maria Bianchini 
for their generosity in reading drafts of this article. In addition she thanks the partici-
pants of New York University’s Lawyering Theory Colloquium for valuable insights, 
especially Peggy Cooper Davis, Andrea McArdle, I. Scott Messinger, and Gloria Marti-
nez Trattles. Particular thanks to Jacob Raddock for his valuable research assistance. 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2. 
 2. Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 
1218 (6th Cir. 1980), reh’g granted, in part, clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 
(1988); reauthorized and amended in part by Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613). There are numerous state ana-
logs to CERCLA. Although these state statutes are beyond the scope of this paper, 
many of the same analytical issues arise in that context as well. 
 4. CERCLA imposes retroactive strict liability for the costs of cleaning up haz-
ardous waste sites on the generators and transporters of the waste and on owners and 
operators of the sites. Liability attaches regardless of when the hazardous waste was 
generated and disposed of and despite the fact that the now sanctionable conduct was 
entirely legal at the time. See generally, United States v. Northeastern Pharm. and 
Chem. Co. [NEPACCO], 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986) (imposing retroactive strict 
liability under CERCLA); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-79 (D. 
Colo. 1985) (imposing retroactive strict liability under CERCLA does not violate due 
process). For an outline of some of the constitutional questions raised by retroactive 
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would also make polluters pay the costs associated with this 
cleanup. To that end, CERCLA gave the federal government 
the authority to cleanup a site using the Superfund5 and then 
seek reimbursement from the Potentially Responsible Parties6 
(“PRPs”); or to require PRPs to undertake the cleanup them-
selves.7 Either way, the private-sector PRPs would finance the 
cleanup of polluted sites. 
The costs associated with these CERCLA cleanups are 
staggering. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) 
estimates that the total costs for cleaning up all sites currently 
listed on the National Priorities List (“NPL”)8 will exceed sev-
enty-four billion in 1994-constant dollars.9 Of that sum, fifty-
eight percent, or forty-three billion dollars, will be born by the 
PRPs.10 The average cost per Superfund site can exceed thirty 
million dollars.11 
 
legislation, see Maria G. Bianchini, Comment, The Tobacco Agreement that Went up in 
Smoke: Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Liti-
gation, 87 CAL. L. REV. 703, 739-43 (1999). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B). 
 6. CERLCA § 107(a) defines responsible parties as: (1) the owner and operator 
of a vessel or a facility; (2) any person who, at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were 
disposed of; (3) any person who arranges for the disposal of hazardous substances at 
any vessel or facility owned by another person and containing such hazardous sub-
stances; and (4) any person who accepts any hazardous substances for transport to 
sites selected by such persons. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). PRP refers to someone who 
might be liable for money spent by the government for corrective action at a site but 
has not yet been deemed liable under the statute. See, e.g., Pacific Resins & Chems., 
Inc. v. EPA, 654 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (using the term PRP). The numbers 
and types of PRPs who potentially face claims under § 107 run the gamut of private 
and public enterprise in this country. PRPs facing environmental liability include (but 
are not limited to): real property owners; building managers; contractors; states, cities, 
and counties; school systems; industrial manufacturers; transportation companies; 
processors of hazardous waste; gasoline stations; electric utilities; railroads; and banks. 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). PRPs have typically found it more economical to clean up 
the sites under consent decrees with the EPA rather than to pay the costs incurred by a 
governmental cleanup. 
 8. CERCLA authorized the EPA to evaluate contamination problems and iden-
tify the worst sites by listing them on the NPL for cleanup under Superfund. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9605. (1988). In 1994, there were nearly 1,300 sites on the NPL, and the number has 
remained roughly constant since then. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE TOTAL 
COSTS OF CLEANING UP NONFEDERAL SUPERFUND SITES 1 (1994) [hereinafter CBO 
REPORT]. 
 9. CBO REPORT, supra note 8, at 13, 36. 
 10. See id. at 10. The Congressional Budget Office further estimates that 38% of 
the costs, or $28 billion, will be paid by the federal government, and 4%, or $3 billion, 
by the states. See id. 
 11. Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning up the Environmental Liability Mess, 27 VAL. 
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In the face of these huge numbers, PRPs look to spread the 
burden of paying CERCLA cleanup costs. Specifically, PRPs 
seek to invoke their insurers’ duties to defend and indemnify 
them (PRPs) under Comprehensive General Liability (“CGL”) 
insurance policies.12 Unfortunately, CERCLA cleanup costs 
typically arise from long-tail injuries that fit awkwardly into 
existing insurance models.13 
Long-tail injuries are progressive—that is, they take place 
slowly, over an extended period of time. Because these long-tail 
injuries occur gradually, PRPs often claim coverage under mul-
tiple insurance policies issued over the course of many years. 
Frequently, insurers are reluctant to pay these atypical claims, 
and disclaim coverage. PRPs respond with coverage suits. The 
resulting litigation can be inordinately complex, involving 
scores of insurance policies covering numerous industrial sites 
for the better part of the century. A policyholder might have 
purchased intricate layers of insurance coverage within each 
policy period. As an added complexity, a policyholder will often 
have gaps in its insurance coverage. As a result, parties fre-
quently spend more time and money litigating responsibility 
for cleanup costs than in actually cleaning up the sites.14 
 
U. L. REV. 601, 613 (1993), cited in Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of 
N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Minn. 1994). The EPA estimates that as many as 2,000 of 
the 30,000 to 50,000 waste disposal sites in this country pose a potential threat to pub-
lic health or the environment. See Mealey’s Litigation Reports - Superfund, Vol. 3, No. 
17 (Dec. 12, 1990), at 16-18 [hereinafter Mealey Superfund]. 
 12. The CGL policy is a standard policy form drafted by the ISO, an insurance 
industry trade organization. These policies have covered most commercial entities in 
the United States since the 1940s. In addition to drafting the form, the ISO appears 
before state regulatory agencies to secure approval of the forms on behalf of its mem-
bers. Virtually every major American insurance company that issues general liability 
insurance uses or follows the basic ISO form policy. The insured typically has no input 
into drafting the terms of the CGL contract. In some cases, the insured does not even 
see the contract until after it has paid the premium. See Nancer Ballard & Peter M. 
Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability Pol-
lution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1990). 
 13. Most insurance policies issued before the mid-1980s provided “occurrence” 
based coverage rather than “claims-made” coverage. As a result, the insurance policies 
were said to have a “long-tail” of coverage that applied to claims brought long after the 
occurrence that gave rise to the claim of liability. Occurrence-based coverage is de-
scribed in detail in Part I of this article. 
 14. Protracted litigation over coverage for environmental losses can, and fre-
quently does, delay site cleanups. See Stephen Mountainspring, Comment, Insurance 
Coverage of CERCLA Response Costs: The Limits of Damages in Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability Policies, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 758 (1988) (coverage disputes between 
insurers and policyholders delay CERCLA cleanups). According to a detailed study 
published by the RAND Corporation in 1991, up to 88% of the monies insurers paid out 
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Fashioning a remedy under these circumstances involves 
reconciling otherwise unrelated insurance contracts. The CGL 
policies themselves provide no guidance on apportioning liabil-
ity for a long-tail injury, nor does CERCLA address the ques-
tion of insurance coverage. In the absence of clear statutory or 
contractual authority, common law must fill the gaps and chart 
the interplay between state insurance law and federal envi-
ronmental law. Unfortunately, the few jurisdictions to confront 
the long-tail allocation question have responded fitfully and 
unsystematically. While nominally applying the same princi-
ples of insurance contract interpretation, they have reached 
disparate, if not downright contradictory, results.15 An almost 
uniform failure to articulate the reasoning driving a particular 
allocation remedy further amplifies the confusion, making it 
virtually impossible to project future outcomes. PRPs and in-
surers are left without predictable guidelines: facing enormous 
but uncertain liabilities.16 
 
for environmental coverage in 1989 went solely to cover transaction costs. See JAN 
PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS 32 (1991) (ana-
lyzing 1989 expenditures). Of that sum, roughly 42% went toward coverage disputes 
with policyholders, 37% to defending policyholders in CERCLA actions, while the re-
maining 21% presumably paid for the cleanups. See id. This percentage of monies at-
tributable to transaction costs is much higher than for CGL policies as a whole at that 
time. See id. Of course CERCLA’s liability principles are more settled than they were 
in 1989. It is therefore likely that a larger percentage of monies currently paid to cover 
environmental claims is attributable to site cleanups. Moreover, it appears that RAND 
defined transaction costs as “the costs that do not go to the understanding or cleanup of 
particular sites. Instead, they are related to the apportionment of cost[s] among [third] 
parties and are essentially frictional in character.” Id. at 6. However, some courts have 
found the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS), a necessary preliminary to 
any cleanup, to be a defense cost rather than a cleanup cost. See, e.g., Aerojet-General 
Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1997) (characterizing RI/FS as a de-
fense cost). To the extent that insurers and PRPs who provided information to RAND 
may have classified RI/FS costs as transaction costs, the RAND report may present an 
overly pessimistic view of expenditures at Superfund sites. 
 15. All courts claim that their goal is to give effect to the mutual intentions of the 
parties to an insurance contract. To that end, courts typically first look to the terms of 
insurance contracts to resolve disputes. If the policy language is clear and explicit, it 
will govern the outcome of any dispute. Unfortunately, CGL policies do not have clear 
(or even vague) language explaining how to allocate losses suffered as a result of long-
tail injuries. Therefore, courts look to canons of construction, notably the policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations and contra preferentem. 
 16. A “rational defendant” should calculate a settlement figure by considering the 
“cost of an adverse trial judgment multiplied by the percentage chance of losing the 
case, plus trial costs, minus out-of-court settlement costs.” Russell Kirobkin & Chris 
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 107, 111 (1994). Because allocation law is so uncertain in environmental 
insurance coverage cases, the cost of an adverse judgment is almost impossible to esti-
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This article examines several core questions in the alloca-
tion process. When is insurance triggered to cover a loss? How 
should responsibility for covering a loss be divvied up? Should 
the policyholder be assigned any share of the loss? If so, under 
what circumstances—any time there is a gap in coverage, or 
only when that gap is rooted in a decision to self-insure? These 
questions implicate fundamental assumptions of existing in-
surance jurisprudence, particularly assumptions about the na-
ture of the contract between the parties. The answers will nec-
essarily reflect policy choices about fairness and about the 
purpose of insurance.17 
Using CERCLA liability as a vehicle, this article builds a 
theoretical framework to make sense of existing allocation ap-
proaches. I contend that the existing law can be resolved into 
two fundamentally different allocation models that all courts 
have implicitly employed: vertical and horizontal allocation.18 
After constructing these theoretical models, this article 
then explores the fundamental goals of the allocation process 
 
mate. Similarly, the likelihood of losing at trial is unquantifiable in the great majority 
of states that have not yet adopted an allocation scheme. See generally Samuel R. 
Gross & Kent D. Syverund, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the 
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991) (identifying uncertainty as to 
scope of liability as a key circumstance that decrease the likelihood of settlement). The 
unsettled state of environmental insurance coverage creates an additional incentive 
toward fully litigating each and every claim by discouraging partial settlements. Poli-
cyholders cannot safely settle with some, but not all, of their insurers. Any policyholder 
who so settles risks that the court will ultimately allocate a greater percentage of the 
liability to the settled policies, thus creating an additional gap in coverage. 
 17. Too often, scholars approaching the question of allocation in the long-tail con-
text have been interested parties. Writing from either the policyholder or insurer liti-
gation camp, their articles jockey for strategic position with a clear eye to influencing 
the judiciary in existing or future litigation. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Domtar 
Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create a Thicket of Potential Un-
fairness for Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769 (1999) (taking a 
strongly pro-policyholder perspective, and identifying various scholarly articles as ei-
ther pro-insurer or pro-policyholder). Such extreme partisanship only further muddies 
the already murky water. This article attempts to avoid this problem by taking what 
courts are actually doing as the departure point for analysis and by building a theoreti-
cal framework from the case law, rather than from a set of a priori assumptions 
 18. For convenience, I have termed these two approaches horizontal and vertical 
allocation. Other writers have used the terms horizontal and vertical allocation to refer 
to different portions of the allocation process. See, e.g., Gillespie, infra note 64; Thomas 
M. Jones, An Introduction to Insurance Allocation Issues in Multiple Trigger Cases, 10 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 31 (1999) (defining horizontal allocation to be exhaustion by layer 
of insurance coverage and vertical allocation to be exhaustion by year). My use of the 
terms differs in that I segregate the allocation process into a two-step analysis, and 
horizontal or vertical refers only to the first step of this two-step analysis. 
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and identifies the shortcomings inherent in both allocation 
models as currently understood. Taking a holistic approach, 
this article seeks to reconcile, to the extent possible, the com-
peting models advanced by interested parties and adopted by 
various jurisdictions. Finally, this article proposes a new allo-
cation system that maximizes the identified goals of the alloca-
tion process, while minimizing any disadvantages. In doing so, 
this article provides a roadmap of the allocation process de-
signed to be useful in future long-tail coverage disputes. Be-
cause claims of long-tail injuries are burgeoning, most notably 
in environmental and toxic tort cases, schemes to standardize 
results and to minimize litigation will be of ever-increasing im-
portance. 
To that end, Part I provides a foundational discussion of in-
surance issues as they relate to the long-tail allocation ques-
tion. This section explains the various contractual provisions at 
issue in allocation lawsuits and provides a summary of cover-
age issues that courts wrestle with before reaching the alloca-
tion question. 
Part II constructs a theoretical framework for what I claim 
are the two basic approaches to the allocation process. This sec-
tion also provides an in-depth analysis of both horizontal and 
vertical allocation, identifying two sub-strands for each alloca-
tion method and closely examining the strengths and weak-
nesses of each approach. This section then argues that all 
courts implicitly engage in a two-step analysis to allocate long-
tail liability. Under this two-step process, liability is first allo-
cated along either the horizontal time axis or the vertical cov-
erage axis. This allocation choice determines liability vis-à-vis 
the various insurers and the policyholder. Only after this fun-
damental allocation step are individual shares of the cleanup 
costs secondarily apportioned to the triggered insurance poli-
cies themselves. 
Part III proposes a new method of secondary apportion-
ment, one which best effectuates the stated goals of each allo-
cation approach while minimizing the disadvantages. In par-
ticular, this section examines existing modes of secondary 
allocation and proposes coupling certain secondary apportion-
ment methods with specific primary allocation methods. 
Finally, Part IV explores the differing approaches the two 
allocation models take to allocating responsibility for any gaps 
in coverage, or “orphan shares.” Orphan shares often represent 
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a significant percentage of the liability at a site. This section 
examines the rationales that support assigning orphan shares 
to one party or another and identifies some serious policy con-
cerns that have not yet been addressed by either horizontal or 
vertical allocation. This section then proposes several solutions 
in the form of additional analytical steps for the allocation 
process. If implemented, these proposed changes to the alloca-
tion process could alleviate some of the shortcomings identified 
in this section and in Part II. 
I. HISTORY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
INJURIES 
The advent of CGL insurance dates back over fifty years. 
During the 1940s, the Insurance Service Organization (“ISO”) 
developed standard CGL policies for use by its member domes-
tic property and casualty insurance companies.19 These com-
prehensive policies were trumpeted as meeting a business’s en-
tire insurance needs under the rubric of a single policy.20 These 
new CGL policies covered all risks of liability for third-party 
bodily injury or property damage, unless specifically excluded.21 
Such comprehensive coverage marked a clear break from past 
insurance marketing practices in which policyholders pur-
chased separate coverage for each hazard, such as fire or theft. 
For each covered hazard, CGL policies contained two essen-
tial promises. In exchange for payment of a premium, the in-
surer promised: (1) to defend the insured from suits alleging 
claims potentially covered under the policy, and (2) to indem-
 
 19. The predecessor organizations to the ISO were the Insurance Rating Board 
(“IRB”) and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (“MIRB”). For convenience, I refer to 
the ISO and its predecessors collectively as the ISO. For an explanation of the central 
role ISO plays in drafting CGL forms and in providing support services necessary for 
writing CGL insurance, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 
(1993). 
 20. Standardization was intended to increase industry efficiency and to eliminate 
confusion in policy interpretation. Standardization did not, however, resolve all inter-
pretation disputes. See, e.g., Tung Yim, Comment, Nailing Jello to the Wall: A Uniform 
Approach for Adjudicating Insurance Coverage Disputes in Products Liability Cases 
with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and Damages, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1243 (1995). 
 21. A typical CGL policy begins with a “Declarations” page. The Declarations 
page lists the different coverages combined under the policy and identifies the portions 
of the premium attributable to each coverage. This portion of the policy also specifies 
any overall or per occurrence liability cap and any deductible. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the various portions of the CGL policy, see Eugene R. Anderson, Liability 
Insurance: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 49 BUS. LAW. 259, 266-69 (1993). 
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nify the policyholder for liability to another arising from prop-
erty damage or bodily injury caused by an occurrence. Policies 
were then individualized through endorsements that modified 
or supplemented the standard language. 
A. Damages Caused by an Occurrence 
Prior to 1966, CGL coverage was “accident-based” rather 
than “occurrence-based.” In 1966, the CGL form was revised to 
ground coverage on an “occurrence” during the policy period.22 
As a result, between 1966 and 1986, most CGL policies pro-
vided that the insurer would pay “all sums which the [policy-
holder] shall become legally obligated to pay as damages be-
cause of bodily injury or property damage to which this 
[insurance] applies, caused by an occurrence.”23 Occurrence was 
defined as “an accident, including injurious exposure to condi-
tions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury 
or property damage neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured.”24 
Because “occurrence” was generally believed to have a 
broader scope than “accident,” this change in language was in-
tended to reflect the broad nature of risks insured by the new 
policies.25 Specifically, many courts narrowly interpreted the 
 
 22. Most insurers do not have the resources to offer insurance coverage on terms 
other than those detailed in CGL forms. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. provides an explanation 
of the central role CGL forms play in insurance underwriting: 
ISO develops standard policy forms and files or lodges them with each State’s in-
surance regulators; most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on 
these forms . . . . For each of its standard policy forms, ISO also supplies actuarial 
and rating information: it collects, aggregates, interprets, and distributes data on 
the premiums charged, claims filed and paid, and defense costs expended with re-
spect to each form and on the basis of these data it predicts future loss trends and 
calculates advisory premium rates. Most ISO members cannot afford to continue to 
use [an ISO] form if ISO withdraws these support services. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 772 (citations omitted). 
 23. John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INS. 
COUNS. J. 223, 234 (1966) (reproducing, as an addendum, a copy of the new general 
comprehensive liability policy). 
 24. Id. at 230-31. 
 25. This 1966 CGL form revision explicitly recognized that CGL policies provided 
coverage for all accidents as long as the insured did not expect or intend to cause dam-
age. This language was a response to a number of decisions which had concluded that 
“accidental” should be construed from the perspective of the injured party. See id. at 
223. This revision also explicitly extended coverage to a continuous condition which 
would cause injury. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODDA, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 
384-85 (1966.) The new language clarified that to be covered, property damage must be 
“neither expected nor intended” from the standpoint of the insured. The notion that 
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term “accident” to mean that the policies only covered those in-
juries that happened accidentally.26 “Occurrence,” on the other 
hand, simply meant something that had happened. Thus, adop-
tion of the term “occurrence,” although plainly covering acci-
dents as well, sent a message that the policies covered any neg-
ligent act as long as the resulting injury was “neither expected 
nor intended.”27 
1. Damages 
CGL policies predicated coverage on “damages caused by an 
occurrence.” The term “property damage,” as used in these poli-
cies, included physical “injury to or destruction of tangible 
property,”28 including “the loss of use thereof at any time re-
sulting therefrom or loss of use of tangible property which has 
not been physically injured or destroyed, provided such loss of 
use is caused by an occurrence during the policy period.”29 As a 
preliminary matter, courts have typically found contamination 
of the environment to fall within the ambit of the property 
damage clause.30 Similarly, most courts conclude that any mon-
 
public policy prevents indemnity for intentional losses is central to insurance law. See 
generally ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES §5.3(a) 
(1988). In interpreting these policies in the environmental context, however, many 
courts have distinguished between an intentional act and an intentional result. Unless 
the policyholder expected or intended the environmental harm, courts typically find 
coverage under CGL policies. 
 26. See Sam P. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or 
Property Damages Under the Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive 
General Liability Policy 4-7, reproduced in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE 
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: A CRITIQUE OF SELECTED PROVISIONS 
(Arthur J. Liederman ed., 1985). 
 27. Many contemporaneous articles written by important ISO figures reflected 
this understanding of the reasons behind the change in wording. For accounts of the 
drafters, see Norman Nachman, The New Policy Provisions for General Liability Insur-
ance, 18 THE ANNALS 197 (Fall 1965). See also Richard Elliot, The New Comprehensive 
General Liability Policy, INS. ADVOC. (Oct. 23, 1965); Tarpey, supra note 23, at 224 (ex-
plaining the 1966 CGL policy drafters’ intentions). 
 28. Tarpey, supra note 23, at 231. 
 29. Id. 
 30. The vast majority of state courts that have addressed the issue construe the 
term “damages” to include CERCLA response costs. See Farmland Indus. Inc. v. Repub-
lic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 
P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 
N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 
N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng’g 
Co., 388 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. 1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 
(Wash. 1990). But see Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990). 
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ies a PRP pays to comply with government orders under 
CERCLA constitute property damages covered under CGL poli-
cies.31 This holds true even when the government orders 
cleanup of the PRP’s own property.32 
In 1973, the CGL form was amended to add a “sudden and 
accidental” pollution exclusion clause.33 This pollution exclu-
sion provided, in relevant part: 
 
For an excellent discussion of the drafting history of this CGL policy provision, see Jor-
dan S. Stanzler & Charles A. Yuen, Coverage for Environmental Cleanup Costs: History 
of the Word “Damages” in the Standard Form Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 
1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 449 (1990). 
 31. See, e.g., Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d 1048, 1053 
(5th Cir. 1996) (Texas law); Anderson Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 49 F.3d 1128, 
1133 (6th Cir. 1995) (Michigan law); Independent Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Missouri law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1511-15 (9th Cir. 1991) (Idaho law); New Castle County 
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1188 (3d Cir. 1991) (Delaware law); 
Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1023, 1029-30 (2d Cir. 
1991) (Vermont law); Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 930 F.2d 96, 100-02 (1st Cir. 1991) (Mas-
sachusetts law); Avondale Indus. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (New York law); Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 
1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1986) (Oregon law). See also David W. Miller, Whether Governmen-
tally Compelled Cleanup Costs Constitute “Damages” Under CGL Policies: The Nation-
wide Environmental Liability Dilemma and a California Model for Its Resolution, 16 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 73 (1991). Indeed, if a policyholder could not cooperate with the 
EPA under a PRP letter without jeopardizing its insurance coverage, policyholders 
would have a significant disincentive to cooperate. Such a rule would strike at the 
heart of voluntary cleanups, forcing the EPA to resort to the Superfund at each and 
every site and to sue each PRP in a cost recovery action. The loss of efficiency would be 
devastating to the cleanup process—no model of efficiency to begin with. 
 32. CGL policies typically contain an owned-property exclusion and cover only 
damage to a third party’s property. Despite this clear exclusion in the CGL policy lan-
guage, an insurer can still be liable for measures taken on the policyholder’s own prop-
erty if those measures are designed and intended to prevent, or to mitigate injury to 
the groundwater, which is typically owned by the state. See Reliance Ins. v. Armstrong 
World Indus. Inc., 678 A.2d 1152 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); AIU Ins. Co. v. Su-
perior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990). But see Bausch & Lomb v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 
625 A.2d 1021 (Md. 1993) (holding that Maryland’s broad regulatory power over 
groundwater did not constitute a property interest within the contemplation of the in-
surance policy in dispute). In addition, many courts have held that the owned-property 
exclusion does not preclude coverage for costs incurred to clean up contaminants on the 
policyholder’s own property if those costs are incurred in order to remedy or to prevent 
further damage to third-party property. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn Constr. Co., 
713 F. Supp. 35, 41 (D. Mass. 1989) (applying Massachusetts law), vacated, 784 F. 
Supp. 927 (D. Mass 1990); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 
1171, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (applying California law). 
 33. This amendment was a joint project between the ISO’s two predecessor or-
ganizations, the IRB and the MIRB. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 12, at 625. In 
addition to drafting the exclusion, these organizations obtained regulatory approval to 
amend the standard CGL form on behalf of their members. 
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[This] insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property 
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or es-
cape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemi-
cals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, con-
taminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or 
any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not 
apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden 
and accidental.34 
When proposing this new language to state insurance com-
missioners, ISO representatives, speaking on behalf of the in-
surance industry, portrayed it as a mere “clarification” of the 
fact that existing CGL policies did not include intentional acts 
of pollution by the policyholder.35 ISO representatives also ex-
plicitly stated that the “sudden and accidental” clause did not 
narrow or limit coverage and that coverage would continue to 
be provided for unintended pollution.36 From 1970 through 
1986, virtually every CGL policy issued in the United States 
 
 34. Robert S. Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 
FORUM 762, 766 (1976). This language was introduced as a mandatory endorsement in 
1970 and was incorporated into the standard CGL policy as exclusion (f) in 1973. In 
this version of the CGL policy, the definition of “occurrence” was modified to be “an ac-
cident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which results, during 
the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended 
from the standpoint of the insured.” Id. at 764. See also Stephen Smirti, Jr. & James 
Stewart, Recent Developments in Insurance Law, in 622 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 
COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 51, 55 (1992). 
 35. Insurance is not available for intentional acts. One hotly contested issue in 
most environmental insurance cases is whether the contamination that forms the basis 
of the coverage claim was “expected or intended” and is thus excluded as an intentional 
act. Because CERCLA imposes retroactive strict liability for pollution that resulted 
from acts that were entirely legal and were part of a PRP’s ordinary course of business, 
“intentionality” becomes a complex question. As a result, many courts have refined the 
“intentional act” exclusion in the environmental context. Rather than merely asking 
whether the act of disposal was intentional, these courts find the exclusion applicable 
only if the resulting pollution was the expected and intended result of the intentional 
acts. For an in-depth description of the ISO representations that the “sudden and acci-
dental” exclusion merely clarified the “intentional act” exclusion, see Carl A. Salisbury, 
Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, The Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion and 
the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia, 21 ENVTL. L. 357 (1991) 
(describing the insurance industry representations throughout the drafting and ap-
proval process). See also Ballard & Manus, supra note 12, at 624-27; United States v. 
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 36. See G. Plews & J. Claflin, The Drafting and Regulatory History of the Stan-
dard Pollution Exclusion, in 691 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 9 (1994) (citing statements of the ISO represen-
tatives); George Pendygraft et al., Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Devel-
opments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REV. 117, 
141 (1988). 
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included this “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion. 
The meaning of the “sudden and accidental” pollution ex-
clusion was widely litigated in the late 1970s and the 1980s as 
policyholders sought coverage for environmental liability 
claims. In response to this litigation, and particularly in light 
of significant insurer losses on this point, in 1986, standard 
CGL policies began including an “absolute” pollution exclusion. 
This new policy language provided that “[t]his insurance does 
not apply to ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of 
the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, 
migration, release or escape of pollutants . . . .”37 In this “abso-
lute” pollution exclusion, pollutants are broadly defined as “any 
solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, in-
cluding smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and 
waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned 
or reclaimed.”38 
While courts have typically interpreted the “absolute” pollu-
tion exclusion to preclude coverage for environmental claims,39 
interpretations of the “sudden and accidental” exclusion have 
been mixed. Many courts have found that the insurers’ earlier 
representations about the nature of the 1973 changes estop 
them from now arguing that this clause excludes coverage for 
 
 37. Michelle I. Schaffer, The Evolution of the Pollution Exclusion: From “Sudden 
and Accidental” to Absolute and Unambiguous, in REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE 
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: COVERAGE PROVISIONS, EXCLUSIONS, AND 
OTHER LITIGATION ISSUES 209, 225 (Peter J. Neeson ed., 1995). After ISO obtained 
regulatory approval of the 1986 form, including this absolute pollution exclusion, it 
eliminated its support services for the 1973 CGL form thus rendering it impossible for 
most ISO members to continue to use the format. This change in language was the sub-
ject of a successful antitrust suit. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
775 (1993). For a thorough discussion of the evolution of CGL language, see Melody A. 
Hamel, Comment, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in Comprehensive General Liability 
Policies: Reasons for Interpretation in Favor of Coverage in 1996 and Beyond, 34 DUQ. 
L. REV. 1083 (1996). 
 38. Schaffer, supra note 37, at 226. See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pol-
lution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute” Exclusion in Context and in Accord with its 
Purposes and Party Expectations, 34 TORT AND INS. L.J. 1 (1998). 
 39. See, e.g., Heyman Assocs. No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 653 A.2d 122 (Conn. 
1995); Deni Assocs. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998); 
Economy Preferred Ins. Co. v. Grandadam, 656 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(listing cases); McGuirk Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 93, 
97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Tri County Serv. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 873 S.W.2d 
719, 721 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). But see Western Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997 
(Mass. 1997) (concluding that the so-called absolute pollution exclusion did not bar 
claims for carbon monoxide poisoning from defective installation and maintenance of 
equipment); American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1997) (same). 
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all long-tail environmental claims.40 
2. Caused by an occurrence 
Under their express terms, CGL policies are occurrence-
based, providing coverage for damages that “occurred” during a 
policy period. In non-long-tail insurance cases, the parties typi-
cally can point to a specific event as the focal point to any cov-
erage determination. Long-tail injuries, because they take 
place slowly, over an extended period of time, do not fit neatly 
into this occurrence-based framework. 
Gradual pollution might continue undetected for five, ten, 
or thirty years. At the time of cleanup, years, or even decades 
of slow, constant contamination may have produced one envi-
ronmental injury that “occurred” over a spectrum of insurance 
policy periods. Under these circumstances, each policy covers 
only a portion of the injury timeline. It is frequently impossible 
to pinpoint a share of a long-tail injury that “occurred” during 
any given policy period. If such proof were required, a policy-
holder that purchased insurance coverage for every year during 
which a long-tail injury took place might still find itself unable 
to recover. Because the CGL language plainly provides cover-
age for gradual and progressive injuries,41 most courts have re-
 
 40. See Alabama Plating Co. v. United States Fidelity Guar., 690 So. 2d 331, 334-
35 (Ala. 1996) (per curiam) (relying on the industry’s representations about the mean-
ing of the “sudden and accidental” clause to determine scope of coverage); Morton Int’l 
Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 872 (N.J. 1993) (same); Joy Techs., Inc. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 421 S.E.2d 493, 497-500 (W. Va. 1992) (finding that it would 
violate public policy to permit insurers to advance a restrictive interpretation of the 
“sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion in light of the industry’s earlier contrary 
representations to insurance regulators); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 
811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 
(Wis. 1990) (same); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co, 933 F.2d 
1162 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Delaware law); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 
S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989). But see Independent Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 41. In Uniroyal Inc. v. Home Insurance Co., for example, Judge Weinstein ob-
served: “The insurance industry developed this newer ‘occurrence’ definition in order to 
provide clearly for coverage of gradual, continuous, and prolonged events that might 
have been excluded by the instantaneous connotation of ‘accident.’ ” 707 F. Supp. 1368, 
1381 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Richard Elliot, the former Secretary of the National Bureau of 
Casualty Underwriters wrote in 1968 about the scope of “occurrence” coverage: “Al-
though it is most common that the injury takes place simultaneously with the expo-
sure, there are many instances of injuries taking place over an extensive period of time 
before they become evident. For example, slow ingestion of foreign substances or inha-
lation of noxious fumes.” Richard Elliot, The New Comprehensive General Liability Pol-
icy, LIAB. INS. DISP. LIT. SER., PLI 12-3, 12-5 (1968), cited in THE COMPREHENSIVE 
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fused to permit insurers to escape liability on this burden of 
proof ground. Instead, in asbestosis cases, for example, courts 
have typically required that the plaintiff produce evidence of 
the etiology of the disease to demonstrate that bodily injury 
likely occurred during the policy period.42 Similarly, in envi-
ronmental contamination cases, there must be evidence of the 
means and timing of the escape of contaminants and of the re-
sulting damage.43 
While CGL policies limit coverage to their policy period, the 
policies do not require that covered damage occur entirely 
within that policy period. Nor must the damage commence or 
terminate during the policy period.44 Rather, CGL policies re-
quire only that some damage occur during the policy period. 
Therefore, CGL policies act like the more familiar automobile 
insurance policy under which a policy in effect at the time of an 
accident covers injuries from the accident, as well as any sub-
sequent claims arising from those injuries, even if the injuries 
later intensify or change in nature.45 The accident or event, for 
purposes of insurance coverage is deemed to have “occurred” 
when the injury was first sustained. Unfortunately, CGL poli-
cies leave unanswered the crucial question for long-tail inju-
ries: when does a continuous condition become an “occurrence” 
 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY—A CRITIQUE OF SELECTED PROVISIONS 26 (1985). 
 42. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 983-85 (N.J. 1994) 
(describing etiology of asbestos-related disease); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. All-
state Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 505-07 (Pa. 1993) (same). 
 43. Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1445-46 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(describing evidence that sufficed as proof of environmental injury within the policy 
period). 
 44. Norman Nachman, manager of the Casualty Insurance and Multiple Line 
Insurance Division of the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters explained treat-
ment of long-tail cases as follows: 
The definition [of occurrence] embraces an injurious exposure to conditions which 
results in injury. Thus, it is no longer necessary that the event causing the injury 
be sudden in character. In most cases, the injury will be simultaneous with the ex-
posure. However, in some other cases, injuries will take place over a long period of 
time before they become manifest. The slow ingestion of foreign matters and inha-
lation of noxious fumes are examples of injuries of this kind. The definition serves 
to identify the time of loss for application of coverage in these cases, viz., the injury 
must take place during the policy period. This means that in exposure-type cases, 
cases involving cumulative injuries, more than one policy contract may come into 
play in determining coverage and its extent under each policy. 
Nachman, supra note 27, at 199-200. 
 45. This rule is typically called the process of nature rule. See, e.g., GEORGE J. 
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INS. LAW, § 62 (1929); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ed-
wards, 174 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing cases). 
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for the purposes of insurance coverage? 
B. Trigger of Coverage 
Because CGL policies provide no guidance on this point, it 
was left to evolving principles of common law to determine the 
type of environmental activities that would constitute an occur-
rence triggering coverage under a CGL policy.46 Starting in the 
asbestos context, courts began defining different notions of a 
trigger of coverage, based on the facts of the case before them. 
Ultimately these courts articulated four basic triggers: (1) ex-
posure,47 (2) manifestation,48 (3) injury in fact,49 and (4) con-
tinuous trigger.50 The first three triggers attempt to define a 
 
 46. The term “trigger” does not appear in the CGL policy; it is wholly a creation 
of the courts. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 880 n.2 
(Cal. 1995) (en banc) (“The word ‘trigger’ is not found in the CGL policies themselves, 
nor does the Insurance Code enumerate or define ‘trigger of coverage.’ Instead, ‘trigger 
of coverage’ is a term of convenience used to describe that which, under the specific 
terms of an insurance policy, must happen in the policy period in order for the potential 
of coverage to arise. The issue is largely one of timing—what must take place within 
the policy’s effective dates for the potential of coverage to be ‘triggered’?”). 
 47. The exposure trigger defines an occurrence at the earliest possible time—
when the exposure to the injurious condition occurs. Because a progressive injury may 
result from a condition that recurs over time, the exposure trigger may result in multi-
ple insurers being liable for the loss. 
 48. The manifestation trigger is the narrowest determination of insurer liability. 
Under this theory, liability is limited to the policy or policies in force when the injury 
manifested itself in an ascertainable form. See Insurance Co. of North America v. 
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1980) (describing manifes-
tation theory), reh’g granted, in part, clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981). But, Forty-
Eight Insulations purported to apply both New Jersey and Illinois law. Both states 
have subsequently rejected the manifestation trigger theory. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994) (adopting a continuous trigger for New Jer-
sey); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 150, 165 (Ill. 1987) (adopting 
a continuous trigger for Illinois). Because this theory assumes a timelag between expo-
sure and manifestation, it has rarely been employed in the long-tail environmental 
context. But see Independent Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 
1334 (D.D.C. 1986) (only insurer whose policy was in effect when release of contami-
nant resulted in diagnosable and compensable injury has triggered duty to indemnify 
policyholder); Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarty’s, Inc., No. 83-1441, 1989 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17566 (D. Idaho Aug. 4, 1989). 
 49. The injury-in-fact trigger requires a finding of actual injury. This trigger, 
which developed in the context of asbestos litigation, is triggered by a real but undis-
covered injury proven in retrospect to have existed at the relevant time period. A few 
courts have adopted an injury-in-fact trigger in the environmental context. See Trian-
gle Publications, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 703 F. Supp. 367, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1989) 
(plain language of the CGL contract supports an injury-in-fact construction); Cortland 
Pump & Equip., Inc. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (App. Div. 1993); Sen-
tinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894, 917 (Haw. 1994). 
 50. First articulated in the context of asbestos and drug exposure cases, the con-
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particular stage of the long-tail injury process as “the occur-
rence.” The fourth trigger abandons that particular task as 
hopeless and instead identifies the entire process as an occur-
rence that happened continually throughout the relevant time 
period. 
As defined in the 1966 and 1973 CGL policies, an occur-
rence clearly could be a continuous process. Defining the trig-
ger for long-tail coverage as a particular snapshot of time 
within that continuous process, such as exposure to the harm-
ful condition or the ultimate manifestation of injury, therefore 
seems incongruous. A more logical reading of “occurrence” in 
the context of the promised continuous process coverage would 
trigger every policy in effect from the first exposure through 
manifestation of a long-tail injury. For that reason, a continu-
ous trigger is probably closer to what the parties intended at 
the time the CGL policies were issued. 51 
A growing majority of courts facing insurance coverage 
questions for long-tail environmental injuries have adopted a 
“continuous trigger” of liability.52 With a continuous trigger, a 
 
tinuous trigger, also called “triple trigger” or “multiple trigger,” affords the broadest 
coverage because it deems liable all policies that covered the policyholder from the ini-
tial exposure to the ultimate discovery of the injury. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. 
of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (asbestos); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Bun-
ker Hill Co., Nos. 79-2010, 82-3082, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15240 (D. Idaho July 3, 
1984); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. (“Montrose II”), 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 
1995). The rationale behind the continuous trigger is that injury may have occurred at 
any point, or at any number of points, during the coverage periods. 
A number of courts have noted that there is no contradiction between an injury-
in-fact trigger and a continuous trigger. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. 
Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 1253-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Sentinel, 875 P.2d at 917. Instead, 
the two notions are complementary. 
 51. ISO explanatory materials buttress such an interpretation:  
[P]resently the standard general liability policies provide coverage for injury which 
occurs during the policy period, regardless of when the exposure to harmful condi-
tion takes place, or when [the] injury become [sic] known or manifest. Under this 
concept, if an injury results from the cumulative exposures over a period of time, it 
will be covered by all policies providing coverage during the period of exposure. 
Minutes of the General Liability Rules and Forms Committee Meeting of March 28, 
1978 at 14, quoted in Marcy Louise Kahn, Looking for “Bodily Injury”: What Triggers 
Coverage Under a Standard Comprehensive Liability Insurance Policy?, 532 THE 
FORUM 30 n.39 and accompanying text (1984). 
 52. See United Techs. Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 989 F. Supp. 128 (D. 
Conn. 1997) (applying Connecticut law); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 
1440 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania law); Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136 (D.N.J. 1993) (applying New Jersey law); 
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); 
United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); 
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long-tail injury is deemed to have “occurred” at each and every 
point of time at which there was contributing contamination. 
Essentially, the courts create a rebuttable presumption that 
one injury or occurrence happened every year from the date the 
gradual injury began to the date of the claim. As a result, every 
insurance policy in effect during the course of the environ-
mental injury is potentially liable on the claim. A continuous 
trigger has the effect of maximizing coverage because property 
damage that is continuous throughout successive policy periods 
will implicate all policies in effect during those periods. 
II. ALLOCATION METHODS 
From the earliest asbestos cases, there has been an almost 
uniform failure to articulate legal theories that justify alloca-
tive strategies in the long-tail context. This paper argues that 
despite the apparent incoherence of the case law, these alloca-
tive strategies can all be resolved into one of two theoretical 
frameworks. The core difference between the two approaches 
grows from one fundamental choice: the initial decision to treat 
long-tail injuries as sui generis or to fit long-tail injuries into 
existing insurance frameworks. 
Courts either ground the allocation squarely within the 
horizontal long-tail timeline from the beginning,53 or ignore the 
horizontal timeline and treat the long-tail injury as though it 
occurred entirely within one insurance period.54 Imagine a grid 
with years of an injury on the horizontal axis and dollar 
amounts of insurance coverage on the vertical axis. In horizon-
tal allocation, liability is assigned along a horizontal time axis 
to all policy periods on the risk over time; in vertical allocation, 
liability is assigned along a vertical coverage axis to all insur-
ers within a selected policy period. 
In an ideal world, all jurisdictions would adopt a single 
model of allocation. Unfortunately, federalism complicates the 
situation because insurance law is within the province of state 
governance. In the absence of federal legislation to standardize 
long-tail insurance coverage (an extremely remote possibility), 
the states are free to devise their own allocation schemes as a 
 
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334, 1345-48 (D.N.J. 1992); Montrose 
Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 880 (Cal. 1995 ). 
 53. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1214-15. 
 54. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1034. 
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matter of state common law. To date, most states have not de-
finitively ruled on which allocation approach to take. Of the 
several state supreme courts that have resolved this allocation 
question, roughly half have employed horizontal allocation and 
half vertical allocation. The choice between the two methods is 
not trivial; the two allocation schemes result in vastly different 
liability implications for the parties involved. This section iden-
tifies the fundamentals of the two allocation approaches and 
explores the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. 
A. Horizontal Allocation 
Horizontal allocation starts from the premise that long-tail 
injuries are sui generis. This approach emphasizes that part of 
a long-tail injury will occur outside any particular policy pe-
riod. Rather than requiring any one policy to cover the entire 
long-tail loss, horizontal allocation instead attempts to produce 
equity across time. Thus, each policy period would be liable 
only for a share of the loss. To reach that conclusion, horizontal 
allocation reduces the policyholder’s entitlement to indemnifi-
cation from its insurers to merely one aspect of a broader allo-
cation of liability among multiple insurers. The court’s first de-
termination is not indemnification of the policyholder by the 
insurer but, instead, involves assigning each year its share of 
the entire long-tail liability.55 These shares of liability are as-
signed, moreover, without regard for the amount of insurance 
for any given year. The policyholder is allocated the burden for 
any gaps in coverage, or “orphan shares.”56 In short, horizontal 
allocation finds the policyholder to be self-insured for any years 
it did not have any, or enough, insurance. 
I have defined two sub-forms of horizontal allocation— 
straight and weighted. Straight-horizontal allocation assigns 
 
 55. This assignment is referred to as “time-on-the-risk” allocation. It assumes, as 
a first step, that it would be impossible to allocate damages for any given year with any 
degree of certainty. Of course the same starting point leads some vertical allocation 
jurisdictions to impose joint and several liability on all triggered policies. See Koppers 
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1451 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[G]iven that ‘because 
each [policy] has been triggered to provide coverage against liability for a single indi-
visible injury, there is no basis for apportioning responsibility among them.’ ”) (citation 
omitted). 
 56. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1214-15; Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 987 (N.J. 1994); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 
552 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 563 N.W.2d 724, 
732 (Minn. 1997). 
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shares of liability on a pro rata basis to all triggered insurance 
policies. Weighted-horizontal allocation, as its name suggests, 
attempts to weight the allocated shares to reflect changing per-
ceptions of risk over time. 
1. Straight-horizontal allocation 
Straight-horizontal allocation employs a straightforward 
calculation to assign shares of long-tail insurance liability.57 
These courts simply add up the number of years over which a 
continuous injury occurred and then assign each year an equal 
share of the loss. To assign liability to each policy period, a 
court calculates a fraction—with the number of years during 
which the injury occurred as the denominator and the number 
of years of coverage provided by an insurance policy period as 
the numerator.58 Based on this fraction, each policy period 
would then be assigned its fractional share of the total liability. 
The policyholder would be included in the allocation scheme for 
any orphan shares.59 
For example, assume a long-tail environmental injury oc-
curred continuously over eighteen years. During the first six 
years, the PRP had no liability insurance. For each of the mid-
dle six years, the PRP had purchased five-million dollars of 
coverage. In the final six years, the PRP was again uninsured. 
Under a straight-horizontal allocation, which would allocate 
the risk evenly over each of the eighteen years, the policies 
purchased during the middle six years would each cover one-
 
 57. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1214-15. In this case, an asbestos 
manufacturer sued five insurers for indemnification for its asbestosis liability. The 
manufacturer had produced asbestos-containing products for the 47 years between 
1923 and 1970. From 1955 through the date of the lawsuit, the manufacturer had been 
continuously insured, albeit by different insurers. The manufacturer had also claimed 
that it had insurance prior to 1955. Noting that any such policies had been lost or de-
stroyed, the Sixth Circuit found that the manufacturer failed to prove coverage before 
that date and was self-insured. See id. at 1215. Thus, the manufacturer had insurance 
coverage for roughly half its exposure period. See id. at 1214. This case is unique 
among long-tail insurance allocation cases because the issue of liability allocation was 
not before the court. The insured conceded that it had to bear a share of liability for the 
22 years in which it had no insurance and only contended that it ought not be allocated 
a share of defense costs. 
 58. See id.; see also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 
1178, 1202-03 (2d Cir. 1995) (detailing the calculation method), modified on denial of 
reh’g, 85 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996); Public Service Co. v. Wallis & Co., No. 97SC792, 1999 
WL 711848, at *17 (Colo. Sept. 13, 1999). 
 59. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1214-15; see also Outboard Marine 
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
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eighteenth of the loss, and would collectively pay one-third of 
the total liability. The remaining two-thirds of liability would 
be allocated to the insured. 
In making this distribution, straight-horizontal allocation 
assigns a dual purpose to the phrase “during the policy period” 
in the CGL policy’s definition of “occurrence.”60 The phrase 
serves both as a trigger of coverage and as a limitation on the 
promised “all sums” coverage.61 Straight-horizontal allocation 
thus interprets the phrase to mean that any insurer contracts 
to pay only those costs that arise during its policy period, and 
not costs incurred outside the covered policy period, regardless 
of whether those costs contributed to, or arose from, damage 
within the covered policy period. 
Simplicity is straight-horizontal allocation’s greatest 
strength.62 But simplicity comes at the price of ignoring real 
world complexities. For example, over time the foreseeability of 
risk differs dramatically. Indeed, in response to an increased 
perception of risk that roughly tracked the development of 
strict tort liability for consumer goods, many policyholders be-
gan purchasing greater amounts of insurance coverage. 
Straight-horizontal allocation does not, and indeed cannot, ac-
count for the increased perceptions of risk over time that rising 
insurance limits reflect. Given horizontal allocation’s focus on 
the degree of risk that the policyholder elected to transfer, and 
that the insurer intended to cover, this flaw is particularly 
troubling. 
 
 60. See Tarpey, supra note 23, for definition of “occurrence.” 
 61. See, e.g., Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1224-25; Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 
1202-03; Outboard Marine Corp., 670 N.E.2d at 750-751; Chemical Leaman Tank Lines 
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136 (D.N.J. 1996); Northern States Power 
Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). 
In Forty-Eight Insulations, the court employed an exposure trigger. It makes in-
tuitive sense that if the triggering occurrence for liability is exposure to asbestos fibers, 
rather than manifestation of disease, or the continual progression of disease, an in-
sured should not be liable for exposures that occur prior to coverage. The resulting 
analysis is thus of questionable value for long-tail environmental cases, which typically 
employ a continuous trigger analysis which assumes that prior acts contribute to the 
cumulative injury that occurs within each policy period. Moreover, both states whose 
law the Sixth Circuit purported to apply in Forty-Eight Insulations have subsequently 
rejected an exposure trigger. See supra, note 48. 
 62. See Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability 
Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (1997) (advocating this 
allocation method as a simple, litigation-reducing process). 
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2. Evolving notions of horizontal allocation 
Fourteen years after the first application of straight-
horizontal allocation, the New Jersey Supreme Court intro-
duced a substantial modification to this method.63 The court re-
tained horizontal allocation’s conceptual foundation, but re-
jected a straight-annual allocation as inappropriately ignoring 
the degree of risk transferred by the purchase of insurance.64 
Mindful that perceptions of risk change over time, the court in-
stead proposed to allocate each insurer’s liability on the basis of 
policy limits multiplied by years of coverage; I have termed this 
method weighted-horizontal allocation.65 
Weighted-horizontal allocation assigns varying shares of li-
ability across the horizontal-time axis depending on the 
amount of coverage purchased in each year. Policy limits be-
come a proxy for perception of risk, and a year-by-year increase 
in policy limits is construed to “reflect[] an increasing aware-
ness of the escalating nature of the risks sought to be trans-
ferred.”66 
For example, assume the same eighteen-year, long-tail en-
vironmental injury mentioned previously. For the first six 
years, the PRP had two million dollars per year in liability in-
surance, and for the next six had three million dollars of cover-
age. In the final six years, the PRP was uninsured. Based on 
the weighted-horizontal allocation’s focus on the escalating na-
ture of risk over time, the last six years would typically be 
treated as though the policyholder had purchased four million 
dollars of coverage per year during that period. Therefore, fifty-
four million dollars, the total coverage either purchased or im-
 
 63. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994). 
 64. See Garrett G. Gillespie, Comment, The Allocation of Coverage Responsibility 
Among Multiple Triggered Commercial General Liability Policies in Environmental 
Cases: Life After Owens-Illinois, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 525 (1996). Owens-Illinois articu-
lated the horizontal method of allocation based on the question it framed—whether the 
policyholder could recover “the sum of all the triggered policies or only some allocated 
portion of each policy.” Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 975. The first choice amounts to 
joint and several liability; the second is the method employed in Owens-Illinois. There 
was a third choice that Owens-Illinois ignored: the choice of vertical allocation without 
stacking as articulated in Armstrong World Industries v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Ct. App. 1996), and Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North Amer-
ica, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 65. See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 993. 
 66. Id. Note that the court does not reconcile this recognition of changing risk 
with the continuous trigger presumption that an injury occurred equally in every year 
for the date of injury to the date of the claim. 
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puted across those eighteen years, would be the base number 
from which each year would be allocated its weighted-share of 
the total loss. The first six years would bear roughly twenty-
two percent (12/54ths); the middle six years thirty-three per-
cent (18/54ths); and the last six years forty-four percent of the 
risk (24/54ths).67 Under this scenario, the PRP would be allo-
cated almost half of the total liability—the share attributable 
to the six uninsured years—while the various insurers would 
be responsible for the rest of the loss. 
Rarely will a policyholder’s past insurance purchasing be-
havior readily lend itself to a weighted-horizontal scheme. 
Faced with the challenges of applying this theoretical model to 
real world situations, including unknown quantities of “self-
insurance,” weighted-horizontal allocation recognizes that the 
calculations central to the allocation method are extremely 
complex. Thus, weighted-horizontal allocation turns for guid-
ance to a special master skilled in the economics of insurance. 
This master would have substantial discretion to develop a 
workable formula that fairly reflected the risks assumed or 
transferred by the parties.68 
Weighted-horizontal allocation explicitly identifies fairness 
and the efficient use of resources as goals for the allocation 
process.69 Like straight-horizontal allocation, it rejects imposi-
tion of joint and several liability, and refuses to interpret in-
surance contracts solely with an eye towards maximizing cov-
erage.70 Both versions of horizontal allocation instead focus on 
the countervailing issue of moral hazard.71 
To that end, both straight- and weighted-horizontal alloca-
tion highlight the inequity of permitting a policyholder that 
 
 67. Example adapted from Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 994. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1202-
1204 (2d Cir. 1995) (adopting Owens-Illinois pro rata by year allocation); Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (defense costs at issue); Out-
board Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); 
Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994) 
(pro rata by year). 
 71. See Kenneth Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 952-55 (1988) (describing moral hazard). In this context, moral 
hazard refers to the possibility of a loss arising from the characteristics of the insured, 
and more particularly from any perverse incentives created by the existence of insur-
ance. For example, policyholders do occasionally set fire to their own buildings in order 
to collect insurance. 
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chose to “go bare” for part of a long-tail injury to recover as 
though it had been fully and continually covered.72 They em-
phasize that “[n]either logic nor precedent support[s]” permit-
ting an insured who purchased insurance for only one of twenty 
years to recover as though it had purchased coverage for all 
twenty of those years.73 Implicit in this reasoning is a refusal to 
import tort notions of joint and several liability into an insur-
ance contract and instead a conclusion that each insurer’s li-
ability must be individual and proportional.74 
Both horizontal approaches are plainly concerned with 
maintaining an incentive for companies to minimize their own 
environmental carelessness. By forcing companies to internal-
ize part of the costs of long-tail liability, the theory goes, com-
panies will be prompted to use better practices in the future. 
Although CERCLA deals with retroactive liability for conduct 
that has long since ceased, courts rightly view themselves as 
setting a precedent for unnamed, and as yet unnamable, future 
long-tail liabilities.75 Horizontal allocation concludes that forc-
ing policyholders to bear a share of the losses will minimize fu-
ture moral-hazard risks. These jurisdictions reason that hori-
zontal allocation will preserve the incentive for policyholders to 
operate with care to minimize their potential exposure to all fu-
ture claims, and to purchase adequate insurance.76 Horizontal 
 
 72. See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 992 (“Because insurance companies can 
spread the costs throughout an industry and thus achieve cost efficiency, the law 
should, at a minimum, not provide disincentives to parties to acquire insurance where 
available to cover their risks.”); see also Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 
1368, 1392 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“A firm that fails to purchase insurance for a period, how-
ever, is self-insuring for all the risk incurred in that period; otherwise it would be re-
ceiving coverage for a period for which it paid no premium. Self-insurance is called ‘go-
ing bare’ for a reason.”). 
 73. Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 
1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980), reh’g granted, in part, clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 
1981). 
 74. See id. The court in Forty-Eight Insulations drew a clear line between the 
PRP’s tort liability for long-tail asbestos injuries, which is typically joint and several, 
and the insurers’ contract liability to indemnify, which the court concluded to be sev-
eral. 
 75. See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 992 (“Our job . . . is not just to solve today’s 
problems but to create incentives that will tend to minimize their recurrence. ‘[T]o send 
the correct signals to the economic system, a judge must appreciate the consequences of 
legal decisions on future behavior.’ Future actors would know that if they do not trans-
fer to insurance companies the risk of their activities that cause continuous and pro-
gressive injury, they may bear that untransferred risk.”) (citation omitted). 
 76. Horizontal allocation apparently does not find a need for incentives to ensure 
that insurers write clear insurance contracts to begin with. For example, CGL policies 
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allocation thus attempts to eliminate any incentive to gamble 
without insurance.77 Weighted-horizontal allocation, as I have 
defined it, differs from its straight-horizontal counterpart by 
incorporating changing perceptions of risk over time into the 
allocation mix in order to more accurately reflect the degree of 
risk transferred or retained during the years at issue. 
3. Weaknesses of the horizontal allocation approach 
A fundamental flaw of horizontal allocation is that both 
methods implicitly read a pro rata allocation clause into the 
CGL policies. Pro rata clauses, which serve to limit an insurer’s 
indemnity obligation to a policyholder, are typically considered 
exclusionary provisions.78 As such, they must be clear and un-
equivocal and cannot be imputed to the insurance contract.79 
Concurrent policies that are silent as to proration are typically 
held jointly and severally liable to the full extent of the policy-
holder’s liability.80 In the absence of an express pro rata provi-
sion, a policyholder may recover the full amount of a loss from 
any insurer, leaving the latter to seek subrogation from the 
other liable insurers.81 
 
(renamed Commercial, rather than Comprehensive, General Liability policies) now 
regularly include aggregate limits, claims-made provisions and/or include defense costs 
within the total payout available under the policy. Some of these provisions were dis-
cussed and rejected during earlier modifications to the CGL policy. Because horizontal 
allocation often gives insurers the benefit of these provisions that were not included in 
the policies, it may create a perverse incentive for insurers. 
 77. Insurance is the opposite of gambling. A gambler creates a risk in the hope of 
making a profit. No risk exists prior to the gambler’s actions. In the insurance model, 
by contrast, risk exists and the insured eliminates or reduces this risk through the 
purchase of insurance. Insurance provides indemnity for the insured should this exist-
ing risk result in a financial loss. An insured thus exchanges the risk of a possible but 
potentially large loss for the smaller, certain loss of an insurance premium. The insurer 
agrees to accept this risk in exchange for a set fee. 
 78. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Health Compensation and Liab. Ins. Co., 652 
A.2d 30, 33 (Del. 1994) (holding that in the absence of an explicit pro rata clause, in-
surance companies cannot limit their obligations to a pro rata share of liability). 
 79. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 707 N.E.2d 425, 428 
(N.Y. 1998) (refusing to read exclusion into policy); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 553 
N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1990) (refusing to impute limitations of liability into automobile in-
surance policy). 
 80. See Monsanto, 652 A.2d at 34. To the extent horizontal allocation is premised 
on the notion that each insurer is responsible only for the portion of a long-tail injury 
that occurs during its policy period, it appears to contradict both the “all sums” lan-
guage of the policy and the conventional insurance rules on proration. 
 81. See Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 851-52 (Tenn. 1998) (finding that in-
surance policies are contracts of adhesion that should be construed liberally to provide 
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Under either straight- or weighted-horizontal allocation, a 
policyholder with enough insurance in one or several policy pe-
riods to cover a loss in full would still be allocated a share if 
there were any periods of no insurance or under-insurance.82 
The lack of insurance at a contractually unrelated point in time 
becomes grounds for denying a policyholder access to the full 
coverage purchased within a policy period. Moreover, to reach 
this end, horizontal allocation determines that “occurrence” 
and “property damage”—terms that prescribe the circum-
stances under which the policy will be triggered—are also con-
tractual limitations on the coverage owed by each insurer once 
its policy is triggered. This approach violates a well-established 
principle of insurance law—limitations are not to be imputed 
into insurance contracts.83 
Weighted-horizontal allocation also begs the question of 
what should happen if the policyholder did not increase its in-
surance coverage over time. When policyholders cooperated by 
purchasing insurance policies with regularly escalating limits, 
filling in any coverage gaps is certainly feasible. But what of 
the situation in which insurance limits jump erratically or do 
not increase at all? Under these circumstances, creating self-
insurance for periods without insurance becomes an exercise of 
judicial creative writing. 
Most troubling is weighted-horizontal allocation’s inability 
 
coverage). 
 82. This method, at least theoretically, can lead to a bizarre outcome. For exam-
ple, if an environmental injury occurs entirely within one year, the policyholder with 
insurance for that year will recover in full. If, however, that same injury occurred over 
a slightly longer period of time (same money damages, same harm to the environment, 
arising from the same continuous occurrence but spilling over into January of the next 
year) and the policyholder did not have insurance for the next year, the policyholder’s 
recovery for the identical injury would be halved. 
 83. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Villicana, 692 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ill. 
1998) (holding that provisions that limit or exclude coverage are to be construed liber-
ally in favor of the insured and against the insurer); Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 
N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989) (“[E]xclusions in insurance contracts are read narrowly 
against the insurer.” (quoting Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 
366 N.W.2d 271, 276 (Minn. 1985))); J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1998) (same); Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 
561, 563 (Ga. 1983) (same); McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 631 P.2d 
947, 949 (Wash. 1981) (same); Goldberger v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 165 F.3d 180, 
182 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying New York Law); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Willett, 704 N.E.2d 923, 
925 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998); Anderson v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co. of Ga., 508 S.E.2d 726, 
730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); DePaolo v. Leatherstocking Coop. Ins. Co., 681 N.Y.S.2d 686, 
688 (Sup. Ct. 1998). 
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to cope with a policyholder that maintained constant levels  
of insurance over time. The logic behind weighted-horizontal  
allocation, that awareness of risk increased over time, would 
dictate that an increased share be allocated to later years re-
gardless of the policyholder’s actual insurance purchasing be-
havior. By maintaining a constant level of insurance in light of 
increased risk, the policyholder has functionally retained a 
greater proportion of the risk. But, because weighted-
horizontal allocation assigns shares of liability in accordance 
with a ratio of years of coverage and policy limits, it cannot as-
sign an increased share of liability to later policy periods if  
the policyholder did not increase coverage. An allocation  
system that purports to divide liability according to degree of 
risk assumed ought to be able to take degree of risk retained 
into account, as well as degree of risk transferred. Weighted-
horizontal allocation is thus vulnerable to the accusation that it 
creates a sliding scale of liability based on perception of risk 
but provides no yardstick by which to measure that percep-
tion.84 
Finally, because both horizontal allocation methods focus 
on each insurer’s prorated duty to the policyholder, rather than 
on indemnifying the policyholder and allocating the loss among 
the triggered policies, they may create a perverse disincentive 
to settling long-tail insurance claims without protracted litiga-
tion. The longer the litigation continues, the longer the insur-
ers can delay paying anything on the claim. Meanwhile, the 
policyholder is left without indemnity, liable to the government 
or to third parties for cleanup costs but unable to recover from 
its insurance providers. Delay can also work to deprive the 
policyholder of the certainty and peace of mind that are part of 
the value that they intend to purchase with their insurance 
premiums. 
 
 84. Owens-Illinois “put[] aside for a moment the problem[s] of periods of self-
insurance.” Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 993 (N.J. 1994). Un-
fortunately, the court never returned to the issue and provided no guidance as to 
whether, or how, courts should create “self-insurance policies” for periods without, or 
with too little, insurance. It is worth noting that Owens-Illinois relied extensively on 
the analysis of an intermediate California court opinion in Armstrong World Industries 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., which was ultimately vacated by the California Su-
preme Court. On remand, the California court reached a result directly contrary to 
Owens-Illinois. See Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
690 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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B. Vertical Allocation 
Vertical allocation starts from a radically different prem-
ise.85 Where horizontal allocation grounded itself in the chrono-
logical sequence of coverage, vertical allocation makes long-tail 
liability parallel conventional insurance liability as closely as 
possible. By initially allocating along a vertical coverage axis, 
vertical allocation separates the question of insurer liability to 
the policyholder from the question of allocation among trig-
gered insurance policies. Because all triggered policies provide 
coverage for a single, continuous injury, this approach finds no 
basis for apportioning liability among triggered years of cover-
age. Vertical allocation thus draws a bright line between the 
event that triggers coverage and the scope of coverage once 
triggered. Once triggered, regardless of whether a long-tail or 
conventional injury did the triggering, a policy is liable for all 
losses up to its limits. 
The policyholder may select a policy period, and that pe-
riod’s insurance limits are applied to the claim. As long as the 
selected policy period has enough insurance coverage, the poli-
cyholder would be fully indemnified for its loss.86 Thus, for the 
hypothetical eighteen-year progressive injury described previ-
ously, the PRP would be able to select any one of those eighteen 
years to be primarily liable for the loss. As long as the loss did 
not exceed the insurance coverage in the selected year, the 
policyholder would be fully indemnified. 
Vertical allocation explicitly rejects the suggestion that a 
policyholder be allocated a share of liability for any uninsured 
periods. Calling such an approach a judicial fiction that de-
prives the policyholder of coverage for which it had paid, verti-
cal allocation refuses to create self-insurance policies for peri-
ods without insurance.87 Instead, vertical allocation would 
 
 85. See Armstrong, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710 (“[W]e conclude that a distinction 
must be drawn between apportionment among multiple insurers and apportionment 
between an insurer and its insured.”); CNA Lloyds of Tex. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 902 
S.W.2d, 657, 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasizing the distinction between policy-
holder-insurer indemnification and insurer-insurer subrogation); Owens-Corning Fi-
berglass Corp. v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 770, 795-96 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 
1995) (same). 
 86. See, e.g., Armstrong, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711; Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of 
North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1047-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 87. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1048-49 (“We have no authority upon which to pretend 
that [the manufacturer] also has a ‘self-insurance’ policy that is triggered for periods in 
which no other policy was purchased. Even if we had the authority, what would we pre-
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require any triggered policy to provide full coverage for all 
long-tail damages, up to its policy limits. Thus, vertical alloca-
tion interprets literally the CGL policy’s promise to pay “all 
sums which the [policyholder] shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages.”88 
Vertical allocation reasons that permitting an insurer to 
transfer a pro rata share of liability to the policyholder contra-
venes the clear “all sums” promise at the heart of the CGL  
policies and deprives the policyholder of coverage for which it 
had paid.89 This reasoning derives from the conventional in- 
surance principle that, once triggered, coverage extends to the  
policyholder’s entire liability for damages attributable to an  
occurrence. 90 
Because each insurer’s duty to indemnify the policyholder 
remains intact under vertical allocation, regardless of any 
other insurers’ duties and liabilities, the amount of insurance 
in other time periods is irrelevant.91 No part of the allocation 
can be based on facts, such as a lack of insurance, that occur 
outside the policy period.92 Underlying this approach is the no-
tion that such an allocation best protects the policyholder’s rea-
sonable expectation that, within a policy period, the entire 
 
tend that the policy provides? What would its limits be?”). See also J.H. France Refrac-
tories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. 1993); Owens Corning, 660 N.E.2d 
at 795. Like horizontal allocation, vertical allocation theory developed in the context of 
asbestos litigation. Drawing from Forty-Eight Insulations, decided the year before, the 
Keene insurer-defendant argued for allocating a pro rata share to the policyholder for 
any periods without insurance. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1048-49. 
 88. Tarpey, supra note 23, at 234. 
 89. See Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Health Comp. & Liab. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 30, 31 
(Del. 1994) (describing horizontal allocation as effecting an unintended forfeiture of 
insurance coverage); CNA Lloyds, 902 S.W.2d at 600; American Physicians Ins. Exch. 
v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994). See also Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042. 
 90. Indeed, even Owens-Illinois acknowledged that “[t]hese are ‘occurrence’ poli-
cies which, by their nature, provide coverage for pre-policy occurrences (acts) which 
cause injury or damage during the policy period.” Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 993 (cita-
tion omitted). 
 91. See Armstrong, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710 (holding that apportionment among 
multiple insurers has no bearing upon the obligation of the insurers to the insured); 
FMC v. Plaisted & Cos., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 499-500 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he availabil-
ity of allocation among multiple insurers is essentially irrelevant to each individual 
insurer’s obligation to its insured under the terms of the parties’ insurance contract.”). 
See also American Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Const. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 257 
(1998). The targeted insurers can then pursue any subrogation rights against other 
triggered insurance policies. 
 92. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047; FMC, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499; B & L Trucking, 
951 P.2d at 257. 
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amount of insurance coverage would be available to cover a 
loss.93 Vertical allocation thus emphasizes that a policyholder 
expects insurance to cover “all sums” of liability during the pol-
icy period, not a proportionate share.94 Any allocation method 
that prorates an insurer’s liability within a policy period, on 
the basis of the policyholder’s insurance coverage outside that 
policy period, would defeat those reasonable expectations by 
converting the paid-for certainty of “all sums” coverage into 
contingent coverage.95 As a logical consequence of this reason-
ing, courts using vertical allocation find that the policyholder is 
covered up to its policy limits for the full extent of its liability 
and need not pay a pro rata share.96 The twin goals of vertical 
allocation theory are thus to place liability for long-tail injuries 
on par with liability for ordinary injuries and to provide a poli-
cyholder with access to all of the insurance it has purchased in 
a policy period. 
The most frequently raised accusation against vertical allo-
cation is that it impermissibly converts the several liability of 
successive insurers into joint and several liability.97 While it is 
true that both straight- and weighted-horizontal allocation 
carefully keep the various insurers’ obligations to a policy-
holder separated, claiming that vertical allocation imposes 
joint and several liability is an oversimplification. Like many 
oversimplifications, this description is not entirely incorrect, 
merely incomplete. 
Were vertical allocation to truly impose joint and several li-
ability, the policy limits would become irrelevant once liability 
attached. Like the PRP who can be liable for the entirety of a 
Superfund site cleanup, regardless of how many other PRPs 
 
 93. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047-48 (noting that policyholder purchased insurance 
to transfer the risk of liability for latent injury and concluding that policyholder was 
purchasing certainty and plainly did not contemplate that this purchased security 
could be undermined by the existence of prior periods in which it was uninsured and in 
which no known or knowable injury occurred). 
 94. See B & L Trucking, 951 P.2d at 257 (“[An] insurance obligation is inter-
preted in a fashion consistent with the undertaking described in the policy label. [Poli-
cyholders] are not purchasing ‘almost comprehensive’ coverage. CGL policies are mar-
keted by insurers as comprehensive in their scope and should be strictly construed 
when the insurer attempts to subtract from the comprehensive scope of its undertak-
ing.” (quoting Olds-Olympic Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 923, 927 
(1996))); Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047. 
 95. See B & L Trucking, 951 P.2d at 257. 
 96. See FMC, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 467. 
 97. See Pendygraft, supra note 36, at 145. 
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could have been named, each insurer would be jointly and sev-
erally liable for the ultimate dollar value of a loss, despite the 
limited amount of insurance it provided. But, absent bad faith, 
no insurer can ever be liable for more than its policy limits. An 
insurer who provided one million dollars in coverage can at 
most be liable for that one million dollars, regardless of the 
magnitude of loss suffered by the policyholder. By selling a pol-
icy, the insurer knows itself to be at risk for the full policy lim-
its. Requiring an insurer to cover a policyholder’s loss up to the 
policy limits thus merely holds the insurer to the full terms of 
its bargain with the policyholder—a far cry from joint and sev-
eral liability. 
There are, however, two clear strands of vertical liability. 
Some vertical-allocation jurisdictions plainly contemplate that, 
up to their respective policy limits, insurers will be jointly and 
severally liable.98 These jurisdictions permit a policyholder to 
recover seriatim from as many insurers as necessary to obtain 
full compensation for a long-tail loss. Others explicitly reject 
imposition of this modified form of joint and several liability.99 
These latter jurisdictions emphasize that a policyholder’s re-
covery cannot exceed the policy limits within one single policy 
period.100 
1. Serial-vertical allocation 
Pennsylvania represents the major forum for what I call 
“serial-vertical” allocation.101 In an unabashed attempt to max-
imize recovery for the policyholder,102 serial-vertical allocation 
permits a policyholder to obtain indemnity from any selected 
 
 98. See Rubenstein v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 694 N.E.2d 381 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1998); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1449 (3d Cir. 1996); B & L 
Trucking, 951 P.2d at 257. 
 99. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1048-49; Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 710 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding “the doctrine of joint and several 
liability has no application to the obligations of successive insurers of a single policy-
holder”). But see J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 509 
(Pa. 1993) (imposing joint and several liability). 
 100. See, e.g., Keene, 667 F.2d at 1049-50. Keene involved only primary insurance 
so the decision is cast in terms of one policy, as opposed to the policies in one policy pe-
riod. See also American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 853-54 (Tex. 
1994). 
 101. See J.H. France, 626 A.2d at 509; Rubenstein, 649 N.E.2d at 381 (imposing 
joint and several liability as described in Pennsylvania law). 
 102. See Koppers Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 146 PITT. LEGAL J., 159, 
160 (1998) (identifying maximization of coverage as the goal of the allocation process). 
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year of coverage. If the loss exceeds the limits of all policies in 
force during that period, the policyholder can then select an-
other and, if necessary, still another policy period to indemnify 
it for the remainder of the loss. Revisiting the hypothetical dis-
cussed previously, assume again that during an eighteen-year 
continuous environmental injury a policyholder had two million 
dollars of coverage per year for the first six years, three million 
for the next six years, and no coverage for the final six years. 
Under serial-vertical allocation, a policyholder would be able to 
recover far more than the three million dollars of coverage pur-
chased in years seven through twelve. For example, if the 
cleanup costs amounted to five million dollars, the policyholder 
could recover the first three million dollars from policies pur-
chased in year seven and could then target any of the remain-
ing policy periods for the balance of the cleanup costs. 
Under this version of vertical allocation, the policyholder 
may exhaust each policy period seriatim.103 All the insurance a 
policyholder ever purchased is available to cover any loss. Until 
the cleanup costs exceeded thirty million dollars—the combined 
policy limits purchased during the eighteen-year period—the 
hypothetical policyholder would be entirely covered for the loss. 
Serial vertical allocation thus effectively stacks the insur-
ance coverage from different policy periods to form one giant 
“uber-policy” with a coverage limit equal to the sum of all pur-
chased insurance policies. Instead of treating a long-tail injury 
as though it occurred in one policy period, this approach treats 
all the triggered insurance as though it were purchased in one 
policy period. The policyholder has access to far more insurance 
than it would ever be entitled to within any one period. The 
clear purpose of such an approach is to permit a policyholder to 
maximize coverage. In doing so, serial vertical allocation de-
feats both goals of vertical allocation: treating long-tail injuries 
as if they occurred in one policy period and permitting the poli-
cyholder access to all insurance purchased within a given pol-
icy period. Such an approach provides the policyholder with a 
troubling windfall in the form of more coverage than the poli-
cyholder could ever have reasonably expected for one injury. 
 
 103. See J.H. France, 626 A.2d at 509 (“When the policy limits of a given insurer 
are exhausted, J.H. France is entitled to seek indemnification from any of the remain-
ing insurers which [were] on the risk.”); see also Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying similar reasoning to environmental cleanup li-
ability). 
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Because the policyholder has access to all triggered policies to 
cover any long-tail loss, there is no incentive to purchase suffi-
cient insurance with any particular insurance period. 
2. Single-vertical allocation. 
What I have termed “single-vertical” allocation, reflects the 
judicial concern that an insurer’s liability for a single occur-
rence be the same regardless of whether the damage stems 
from long-term exposure or from an immediate occurrence. 
Both types of claims involve only one insurable event. Single-
vertical allocation attempts to match this single insurable 
event to the available coverage by permitting a policyholder to 
select one policy period from which to recover for its loss. Only 
the policy limits of the selected policy period may be applied to 
a long-tail loss, regardless of the number of policy periods trig-
gered.104 Policyholders have access to all the insurance pur-
chased within a single policy period but cannot increase the 
available coverage by accessing insurance across policy periods. 
Any loss that exceeds the policy limits of the selected policy pe-
riod must be born by the policyholder. For example, in the 
eighteen-year hypothetical discussed above, the policyholder 
would be able to select the year to respond to the claim in the 
first instance. The policyholder would be able to obtain full in-
demnification (up to three million dollars of liability) by select-
ing one of the middle six years to provide coverage. The fact 
that the policyholder had no insurance for part of the injury 
would be irrelevant.105 
Under the logic of single-vertical allocation, a long-tail in-
jury triggers multiple funding sources but does not alter the to-
tal amount of insurance available to cover a loss.106 Thus, any 
cleanup costs that exceeded the three-million-dollar policy lim-
its would be borne by the policyholder. Any other result, this 
theory reasons, would construe insurance policies differently 
 
 104. See FMC v. Plaisted & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (Ct. App. 1998); American 
Physicians, 876 S.W.2d at 853-54. 
 105. The selected policy period would not have to bear the entire burden of the 
loss, however. Instead, the insurer will pay the claim and then seek contribution from 
other liable insurers. See, e.g., In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 158 F.3d 65, 84 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 106. See American Physicians, 876 S.W.2d at 842 (concluding that for indemnity 
purposes, coverage under consecutive insurance policies cannot be stacked to multiply 
coverage for a single claim involving an indivisible injury). 
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for long-tail injuries than for other contexts and would defeat 
the insured’s expectation that insurance will cover “all sums” of 
liability up to the policy limits. 
When coverage for an occurrence is triggered in more than 
one policy period, single-vertical allocation permits a policy-
holder to select the policy period that will respond to the claim. 
But single-vertical allocation leaves the risk of inadequate  
insurance within a policy period squarely with the policy-
holder.107 The incentive therefore remains to have insurance 
coverage. 
Both forms of vertical allocation are vulnerable to the accu-
sation that they create insurance for years when the policy-
holder purchased little or no coverage. Vertical allocation per-
mits the policyholder to select a single policy period to be liable 
initially for the entire ultimate loss, up to its policy limits. The 
decision that no share should be allocated to a policyholder be-
cause the insurer is liable for “all sums” ignores the fact that 
some damage may have occurred in periods without insurance. 
By permitting a snapshot in time to substitute for the actual 
timeline (i.e. by excising the selected policy period out of its 
horizontal time context), vertical allocation denies the unique-
ness of long-tail injuries and ignores their cumulative nature. A 
policyholder that had little or no insurance in all but one policy 
period would still fully recover for its loss and a policyholder 
that purchased small amounts of insurance every year would 
not. 
Even acknowledging this problem, however, single-vertical 
allocation’s strengths far outweigh its weaknesses, while the 
opposite is true of horizontal allocation and of serial-vertical al-
location. Moreover, the single-vertical approach is more consis-
tent with the rest of insurance jurisprudence than is horizontal 
allocation and has fewer and more remediable flaws. This is so 
particularly in light of the basic insurance law principle of con-
tra preferentem,108 and in light of the fact that this entire prob-
lem derives from a failure to draft the insurance contract to 
 
 107. The insurers in the selected policy period will bear the risk of being unable to 
spread their loss among other insurance periods (for example, due to insurer insolvency 
or to a policyholder’s failure to purchase insurance) but do not bear the risk that the 
insured purchased inadequate insurance within a policy period. 
 108. Contra preferentem, literally “against the offeror,” refers to the general rule of 
construction in insurance disputes that ambiguities in policy language are construed 
against the insurance company. See generally, BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. 
NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES §1.03[b] (8th ed. 1995). 
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deal with the foreseeable problems of long-tail injuries.109 Ulti-
mately, the equities favor adoption of single-vertical allocation. 
III. SECONDARY APPORTIONMENT 
The allocation remedies outlined in the prior section pre-
suppose that allocation of long-tail liability necessarily occurs 
in two conceptual stages. During the primary allocation phase, 
liability is either assigned horizontally to policy periods or ver-
tically to policies within a selected policy period. Merely stating 
that allocation will be vertical or horizontal does not end the 
analysis, however. A secondary apportionment is needed to eq-
uitably spread shares of liability to all the triggered policies. In 
vertical allocation, the primary allocation is an indemnification 
proceeding between the policyholder and its insurers, with a 
secondary proceeding to apportion among the other triggered 
insurers based on contribution and subrogation rights. For 
horizontal allocation, the primary allocation assigns shares of 
liability to triggered years while the secondary analysis appor-
tions the assigned share of liability among the policies within 
each triggered time period. Although few jurisdictions have ad-
dressed the question of secondary apportionment, all have re-
ferred to the need for some such apportionment to complete the 
allocation process. 
A. “Other Insurance” Clauses Do Not Provide Guidance for 
Secondary Apportionment 
To the extent they have considered the issue, both horizon-
tal and vertical allocation start from the same point for phase 
two apportionment—the CGL contract itself.110 The only con-
tract language that could possibly be relevant to this determi-
nation is the “other insurance” clause. “Other insurance” 
 
 109. Even assuming that retroactive strict liability under CERCLA was not fore-
seeable as such, the ISO considered drafting CGL policies to clearly allocate shares of 
long-tail injuries but elected instead to let the ambiguities remain. See Nachman, su-
pra note 27 (indicating awareness of the problem in 1966); Gillespie, supra note 64 (ar-
guing that contra preferentem weighs in favor of rejecting horizontal allocation). 
 110. In particular, both methods carefully deconstruct the coverage provision of 
the standard CGL policy providing that an insurer will pay “all sums which the [poli-
cyholder] shall become legally obligated to pay” for damages direct and consequential 
on account of property damage caused by or arising out of each occurrence during the 
policy period. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. 
Supp. 1136, 1141 (D.N.J. 1993); see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (citing various insurance policy language). 
BRAT-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:22 AM 
1215] APPORTIONING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 1249 
clauses purport to divide liability among multiple insurance 
policies. In the conventional insurance context, “other insur-
ance” clauses allocate liability among insurers within a single 
insurance period.111 It is therefore not surprising that courts 
have looked to “other insurance” clauses to guide secondary 
apportionment for long-tail claims. The greatest appeal of this 
approach is that the court could claim to be enforcing the bar-
gain between the parties. In practice, however, such extensions 
distort “other insurance” clauses past all recognition. 
There are three basic types of “other insurance” clauses: pro 
rata,112 excess,113 and escape.114 Policies without any form of 
“other insurance” clause must pay before policies containing 
“other insurance” clauses. Excess “other insurance” clauses 
purport to limit a policy’s liability to providing additional cov-
erage once the policy limits of all other available insurance are 
exhausted. Pro rata provisions attempt to allocate financial re-
sponsibility between policies based on the percentage of cover-
age each policy bears compared to the net amount of coverage 
under all applicable policies. Escape clauses attempt to release 
the insurer from all liability to the insured if other coverage is 
available. 
The problem with “other insurance” clauses is that, unless 
all the relevant policies contain pro rata “other insurance” 
clauses, literal application of the “other insurance” clauses 
would result in under-recovery. A pro rata “other insurance” 
 
 111. See generally GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 62 
(1929). “Other insurance” clauses provide for allocation among insurers, not between 
the insurer and a policyholder. 
 112. Pro rata “other insurance” clauses typically follow one of two patterns. Some 
clauses provide that the insurer will pay a pro rata share of a loss in proportion to the 
ratio of its policy limits to the total policy limits of all insurance covering the same loss. 
Other pro rata clauses provide that the insurer will contribute equally with all other 
policies covering a loss until the first policy limit is exhausted. Then the insurer will 
contribute equally with the remaining carriers to cover the rest of the loss up to the 
next policy limit, and so on. 
 113. An excess “other insurance” clause directs that any other insurance contract 
which covers the same loss must be exhausted before the policy containing the excess 
“other insurance” clause will pay on a loss. See Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Trinity Uni-
versal Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1256 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988). If all of the triggered insurance 
policies contain “excess other insurance” clauses, courts routinely find these excess 
clauses mutually repugnant. 
 114. An escape “other insurance” clause states that the policy will not be liable for 
any loss covered by “other insurance.” This language purports to permit a particular 
carrier to escape any liability for a loss if the policyholder has any other insurance. 
Courts do not favor escape clauses. 
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clause would always pay only a pro rata share, and those poli-
cies with excess and/or escape clauses, if interpreted literally, 
would pay nothing. Coverage under these policies would be il-
lusory because a policyholder would never be able to collect for 
a loss if it had any other insurance. Moreover, literal interpre-
tation of these clauses would create a clear incentive not to 
purchase much insurance—a policyholder with multiple insur-
ance policies would be worse off than a policyholder that pur-
chased only one policy. 
To resolve this problem, a complex body of common law de-
termines how the different “other insurance” clauses interact. 
Thus, even when nominally implementing “other insurance” 
clauses, courts are really exercising equitable powers to har-
monize the clauses in a way that permits recovery for the poli-
cyholder. Frequently, “other insurance” clauses are deemed 
mutually repugnant115 and are disregarded. 
The basic problem with resort to “other insurance” clauses 
in the long-tail context is the undeniable fact that “other insur-
ance” clauses are intended to prevent double recovery, not to 
allocate liability over multiple policy periods.116 Unlike the con-
ventional insurance scenario, an insurer has absolutely no way 
to predict, guess, or prophesy what insurance its policyholder 
will purchase in the future, let alone what sort of “other insur-
ance” clauses those policies will have. Nothing in the “other in-
surance” clauses themselves indicates any intention that these 
provisions might be enforced across multiple policy periods. 
Under these circumstances, looking to “other insurance” 
clauses to allocate liability neither implements the intent of the 
parties, nor produces an equitable result. 
As long-tail insurance allocation methods have been refined 
and developed, they have moved away from reliance on “other 
insurance” clauses. Thus, vertical and horizontal jurisprudence 
increasingly recognize the impropriety of resort to “other in-
surance” clauses in the long-tail context. Instead, courts typi-
 
 115. This rule is known as the Lamb-Weston doctrine. This doctrine provides that 
any conflict between contradictory insurance clauses, of whatever type, renders all 
such clauses mutually repugnant. See Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 341 
P.2d 110 (Or. 1959) (en banc). See generally, BARRY & NEWMAN, supra note 108, § 
11.03. 
 116. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vigilant Ins. Co, 919 F.2d 235, 241 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (noting that “other insurance” clauses apply only to concurrent insurance 
policies). When many of these insurance policies were written, the notion of a continu-
ous trigger did not exist. 
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cally acknowledge that they are acting in equity, set aside 
“other insurance” clauses, and then develop an equitable allo-
cation scheme for all of the triggered policies.117 
B. Solving the Horizontal Phase-Two Problem: “Fill-the-Glass” 
Secondary Apportionment 
Within each policy period, a policyholder may have pur-
chased a complex array of primary and excess policies. Hori-
zontal allocation dodges the question of how to divide shares of 
liability among the policies within each triggered period. 
Straight-horizontal allocation refers vaguely to “other insur-
ance clauses,”118 while weighted horizontal allocation places its 
faith entirely in the “specialized procedures” to be developed by 
the proposed special masters.119 Because neither method fin-
ishes the allocation task, let alone offers the predictability that 
would facilitate settlement, neither method alone is particu-
larly satisfactory. 
Once “other insurance” clauses are set aside, the logic be-
hind either method of horizontal allocation leads to a single 
approach in phase two apportionment—what I call “Fill-the-
Glass” secondary apportionment.120 Fill-the-Glass secondary 
apportionment rejects resort to “other insurance” clauses on 
the ground that those clauses make no sense when dealing 
with an injury that occurred across policy periods.121 Instead, 
Fill-the-Glass secondary apportionment refines horizontal allo-
cation to account for the structure of insurance coverage within 
a policy period. 
Liability is first assigned across the horizontal time axis.122 
 
 117. See Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35 
(Ct. App. 1993); Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1980) (en banc). 
 118. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 
1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980), reh’g granted, in part, clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 
1981). 
 119. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 993 (N.J. 1994). 
 120. This method is employed (albeit without the name fill-the-glass) in Chemical 
Leaman. See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 
1136 (D.N.J. 1996). While I would love to be able to claim to have invented this term, I 
am not its author. I do not know its exact origins, but I was first introduced to the term 
by Fred Nemeth at Dechert Price and Rhoads in Philadelphia. 
 121. For a discussion of “other insurance” clause jurisprudence, see supra Part 
III.A. Similarly, Outboard Marine soundly rejected resort to “other insurance” clauses 
as “illogical” in the context of long-tail liability. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) 
 122. Under weighted-horizontal, a larger percentage of any loss will be attributed 
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Then, within each policy period, shares of liability are appor-
tioned vertically along the coverage axis in a bottom-up fash-
ion, much the way water “fills a glass.”123 As a result, this 
method produces an equitable allocation across the horizontal 
time axis while still respecting the bottom-up structure of cov-
erage liability within each policy period.124 
Within each policy period, the primary insurers must pay 
first. When primary coverage is exhausted, the secondary in-
surers must then pay, and so on up the coverage ladder within 
each policy period. Primary insurers will thus pay before over-
lying excess insurers, but not necessarily before excess insurers 
from other policy periods. For example, in Year One, a policy-
holder might have one million dollars of primary insurance and 
ten million dollars of overlying excess insurance. If in Year 
Two, the policyholder had two million dollars of primary insur-
ance, the excess policy in Year One would be triggered before 
the primary policy in Year Two is exhausted. As each excess 
insurer has a contractual obligation to provide coverage once 
the underlying layer of insurance has been exhausted, this 
method conforms to the existing contractual relationships be-
tween the parties.125 
By following the frequently elaborate layers of coverage is-
sued by the various insurers, this apportionment nicely har-
monizes the insurance contract regime established by the par-
ties with the unforeseen circumstance of retroactive 
environmental liability. Moreover, the resulting apportionment 
mimics allocation of liability for conventional insurance, 
thereby achieving one of the identified goals of vertical alloca-
tion, in addition to furthering the efficiency and fairness sought 
by horizontal allocation. As importantly, fill-the-glass secon-
dary apportionment can offer a predictability that serves to 
 
to the years after products liability law began to develop in earnest. See Owens-Illinois, 
650 A.2d at 992. 
 123. See Chemical Leaman, 817 F. Supp. 1136; Outboard Marine, 670 N.E.2d at 
746; Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). 
 124. Because the Chemical Leaman court was faced with a situation in which all 
primary insurers had settled, the court did not have to address the question of the rela-
tive liability between primary and excess policies; this secondary apportionment 
method works equally well, however, if both primary and excess policies are involved. 
See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116, 1124 (N.J. 1998) (adopting 
Chemical Leaman’s reasoning and expanding it to situations involving primary and 
excess insurance). 
 125. See Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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minimize litigation. 
While fill-the-glass secondary apportionment has many 
strengths, it has one fundamental weakness: its inability to 
consistently and equitably deal with orphan shares of liability. 
Section IV explores this problem in detail and suggests a series 
of modifications that can mitigate, though not eliminate, this 
weakness. 
C. Vertical Allocation Methods of Secondary Apportionment 
Because vertical allocation does not adjudicate rights be-
tween triggered policy periods as a matter of primary alloca-
tion,126 secondary apportionment raises the most interesting 
questions of the vertical allocation process. Like horizontal al-
location, courts employing vertical allocation typically reject re-
sort to “other insurance” clauses. Instead, these jurisdictions 
approach secondary apportionment primarily through two 
methods: Policy Limits or Time-on-the-Risk apportionment. 
1. Policy limits apportionment 
The majority approach for apportioning conventional insur-
ance is to assign shares of liability based on a ratio of each 
triggered policy limit to the total limits of all the triggered poli-
cies.127 In the long-tail context, each triggered policy, across all 
 
 126. Allocation claims can arise in one of three contexts: (1) policyholder sues in-
surer for coverage; (2) insurer sues other insurers for contribution; and (3) policyholder 
that has settled with some insurers sues remaining insurers for indemnity. This third 
scenario presents an additional challenge to vertical allocation jurisprudence. When 
the policyholder has settled with one or more insurers, the initial vertical allocation 
question of necessity involves resolution of the secondary horizontal allocation ques-
tion. In apportioning a share of total liability to the settled policies, the court must si-
multaneously conduct both inquiries. 
 127. See CNA Cas. of Cal. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1986); 
Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Mont. 
1991), aff’d, 981 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1992). As a modification of the policy limits ap-
proach, parties sometimes advocate allocating equal shares of liability to all triggered 
insurance policies. This allocation method shares the ease of administration but also 
the flaws of the policy limits approach. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (rejecting equal shares allocation). The argument under-
lying an equal shares allocation is that all insurers have agreed to cover a loss up to 
the limits of their policies. For example, if in four triggered policy periods, the insured 
has insurance that provides coverage in amounts ranging from one to four million dol-
lars, all four policies have equally promised to cover the first million dollars of liability. 
Until the million-dollar limit of the smallest policy is reached, policy-limits allocation is 
in effect a subsidy from the three larger policies to the smaller policy. But, while such 
an allocation might make some sense within layers of coverage, applying it equally to 
BRAT-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:22 AM 
1254 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
triggered time periods will be assigned a share of liability 
based on a ratio of its policy limits to the total of the combined 
triggered policy limits.128 The great advantage of this method is 
its ease of administration. The calculations are straightforward 
and can be performed quickly and easily by the parties or the 
court. This approach, however, completely ignores the layers of 
coverage a policyholder may have purchased and assumes that 
all insurers retain the same risk of loss vis-à-vis a claim by the 
policyholder.129 
The Koppers decision, as applied by the district court on 
remand,130 typifies the shortcomings of policy limits apportion-
ment in the long-tail context. On remand, the Koppers district 
court rejected “other insurance” clauses and instead employed 
what I have termed “serial-vertical” allocation, coupled with 
policy limits apportionment. First, the court held that all trig-
gered policies were jointly and severally liable. Then, because 
the mutually repugnant “other insurance” clauses cancelled 
out, the court concluded that “all [remaining] policies [were] on 
an equal footing as though they all provided primary cover-
age.”131 Thus, with one fell swoop, the court collapsed complex 
 
primary and excess insurers disregards the degree of risk an insured transferred or 
retained over time. 
 128. In Koppers, for example, the plaintiff selected the years of insurance that 
would be liable in the first instance. On appeal, the Third Circuit directed that the in-
surer’s liability be offset by an “apportioned share” assigned to settling insurers equiva-
lent to their pro rata share of the liability. See Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 
F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 129. Such an assumption runs counter to the clear language of the insurance con-
tracts themselves. Primary insurance provides an initial layer of protection against 
liability. Excess insurance, by contrast, provides coverage only after a predetermined 
amount of primary coverage has been exhausted. The expected loss costs for primary 
insurers are therefore larger than for excess insurers. As a result, each dollar of pri-
mary insurance coverage is usually more expensive than the same dollar of excess in-
surance. See, e.g., American Specialty Risk Ins. Co. v. A-Best Products, Inc., 975 F. 
Supp. 1019, 1021 (N.D. Ohio 1997), aff’d mem., 166 F.3d 1213 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 130. See Koppers Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. 85-2136, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16123, at *15 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 1997), on remand from Kop-
pers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania 
law). It is not entirely clear that this unpublished opinion, which purports to “mold” the 
trial verdict in light of the Third Circuit’s opinion is still good law. The opinion is avail-
able only on Lexis and cannot be found on Westlaw. Moreover, a published opinion is-
sued the next month in the same case, 993 F. Supp 358 (W.D. Pa. 1997), suggests in a 
footnote that the allocation process was not yet finished. Either way, this opinion, 
which embodies all the worst aspects of serial-vertical allocation, is useful for illustra-
tive purposes. 
 131. Koppers, No. 85-2136, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16123, at *15. 
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layers of consecutive coverage into one giant mass of concur-
rent insurance coverage. The court then stacked132 all insur-
ance policies together to determine the total amount of cover-
age available. Based on this total, the Koppers court assigned 
each insurer a proportional share of liability. 
This apportionment method ignored the policyholder’s 
elaborately constructed layers of primary and excess insurance 
coverage. Excess policies133 typically provide coverage only after 
a certain lower level of insurance coverage, or self-insurance, 
has been exhausted.134 Based on this difference in the risk as-
sumed, excess insurance carriers generally write insurance 
policies at premiums lower than primary insurers.135 By calcu-
 
 132. As articulated in J.H. France, Pennsylvania permits stacking of insurance 
policies. See J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993). 
Most states that have considered the issue have refused to permit stacking of consecu-
tive insurance policies. 
 133. Excess insurance policies are not to be confused with excess “other insurance” 
clauses. Excess “other insurance” clauses purport to define the interrelationship be-
tween insurance policies. Excess policies, by contrast, set as a condition of the insurer-
policyholder relationship, a threshold loss that must be exceeded before the insurance 
will be triggered. Excess insurance policies are therefore written in excess of underly-
ing coverage. Sometimes these excess policies are excess to the specific underlying pol-
icy and sometimes they are excess to the amount of the underlying policies. Either way, 
it is clear that both insurer and policyholder contemplated that these excess policies 
should not be liable in the first instance. See General Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., No. CIV.A.89-7924, 1994 WL 246375 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that all applicable 
primary coverage must be exhausted before an excess insurer’s liability arises, not just 
the underlying policies specifically set forth in a given excess policy); Iolab Corp. v. 
Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Continental Cas. Co. v. Arm-
strong World Indus., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (same); North River Ins. 
Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 129 (Ct. App. 1989). But see 
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 
1997); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying 
Pennsylvania law). 
Excess insurers frequently attempt to import the requirement that all primary 
insurance policies be exhausted before any secondary policies pay into the continuous 
trigger scenario. Requiring all primary policies to exhaust first might therefore argua-
bly stay closer to the intent of the contracting parties. But in fact, such a requirement 
gives excess carriers a tremendous windfall. The typical excess insurance policy re-
quires only exhaustion of specifically designated “underlying” limits of liability, noth-
ing more. Requiring all primary policies across time to exhaust first would be a direct 
subsidy from the primary to the secondary carriers. Such an approach would not effec-
tuate any contractual intent of the parties and would permit happenstance to swing 
allocations of significant sums of money. 
 134. See Continental Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384 
(N.D. Cal. 1981); Associated Int’l Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 Cal. 
Rptr. 485 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 135. Courts have generally concluded that those insurers should not be required to 
cover risks on an equal basis with primary carriers. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Em-
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lating a proportional share for each insurance policy without 
regard to the exhaustion of underlying policies, the court in ef-
fect rewrites those policies. For example, a policy that provides 
one million dollars as excess coverage over twenty million dol-
lars in underlying primary and excess policies will pay dollar 
for dollar with a policy providing one million dollars of primary 
coverage. 
Finally, under a policy-limits approach, shares of liability 
are allocated solely on the happenstance of how much insur-
ance the policyholder purchased over an extended period of 
time. Information about a policyholder’s future behavior was 
not available when the policies were issued and therefore 
played no part in the parties’ expectations. Such information, 
moreover, is typically unavailable to the insurers before litiga-
tion commences, making settlement difficult and planning for 
potential liabilities impossible. 
2. “Time-on-the-Risk” apportionment136 
By contrast, what I have termed “time-on-the-risk” secon-
dary apportionment allows vertical allocation to consider issues 
unique to long-tail injuries. In many ways the obverse of 
weighted-horizontal allocation, time-on-the-risk secondary ap-
portionment offers the best method of spreading a long-tail loss 
across the horizontal time axis after an initial vertical alloca-
tion. First the policyholder selects a targeted insurance period 
to pay any claims. Within this period, the insurance policies 
are exhausted vertically—primary, then first-level excess, and 
so on up the coverage ladder. These targeted insurers can then 
seek subrogation or contribution from the other triggered policy 
periods, which are deemed liable in proportion to the years and 
amounts of coverage they provided.137 
Applying this time-on-the-risk analysis permits a vertical 
allocation court to acknowledge the existence of horizontal time 
frame and to apportion the loss along it, while still requiring 
 
ployees Liab. Assurance Corp., 445 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1971); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Truck Ins. Exch., 420 P.2d 66 (Or. 1966) (en banc). 
 136. Time-on-the-risk is often used to refer to straight-horizontal allocation. The 
term arose from the Armstrong case, which employed vertical allocation with secondary 
time-on-the risk apportionment. I use the term in its original sense. See Armstrong 
World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 710 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 137. Within each policy period, liability is again allocated along the vertical cover-
age ladder. 
BRAT-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:22 AM 
1215] APPORTIONING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 1257 
insurers to provide “all sums” indemnification to the insured. 
By permitting a court to consider time-on-the-risk in conjunc-
tion with policy limits, this method provides for equitable ap-
portionment of liability among the insurers. Because it respects 
the degree of risk assumed by the various insurers,138 time-on-
the-risk secondary apportionment can accommodate the long-
tail scenario while still preserving the vertical allocation goal of 
treating long-tail injuries like conventional injuries. Insurers 
who contracted for greater exposure through higher policy lim-
its or through a longer period of exposure will bear a larger 
share of any loss. 
Although closely related to horizontal allocation, time-on-
the-risk secondary apportionment avoids the major logistical 
problems associated with weighted-horizontal allocation. 
Where horizontal allocation must create fictitious “self-
insurance” policies for periods without insurance, those years 
simply drop out of the time-on-the-risk secondary apportion-
ment. 
IV. COMPARISON OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL ALLOCATION: 
TREATMENT OF ORPHAN SHARES 
The core difference between the two approaches to alloca-
tion is the fate of any orphan shares—shares of liability that 
might otherwise be attributable to an insolvent insurer, to a 
lost insurance policy, or to a period without insurance. In verti-
cal allocation, the insurers are typically on the hook for these 
sums, while in horizontal allocation, that same share would be 
allocated to the policyholder. 
A. Orphan Shares in Vertical Allocation 
If the policyholder’s coverage over the targeted policy period 
is sufficient, vertical allocation will assign any orphan share 
entirely to the insurers. For this reason, critics frequently ac-
cuse vertical allocation of engaging in an ends-rationalized at-
tempt to maximize the insurance coverage available to contrib-
ute to an environmental cleanup.139 Although there is language 
 
 138. To achieve that end, a court can apportion greater shares of liability to more 
recent years, which will presumably have more insurance coverage. 
 139. See Doherty, supra note 62; Rob S. Register, Comment, Apportioning Cover-
age Responsibility of Consecutive Insurers Where the Actual Occurrence of Injury Can-
not Be Ascertained: Who Has to Contribute to a Settlement?, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1151 
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in some of the cases that could be interpreted to support this 
accusation,140 it is important to remember that single-vertical 
allocation does not necessarily maximize coverage. If, for ex-
ample, a policyholder suffered a six-million-dollar loss as a re-
sult of an eighteen-year continuous long-tail injury, but had 
only one million dollars of insurance coverage each year, single-
vertical allocation would result in a substantially smaller re-
covery than would horizontal allocation. Under single-vertical 
allocation, the most the policyholder could recover would be one 
million dollars—the maximum policy limits for each year. Un-
der horizontal allocation, by contrast, the policyholder would be 
fully covered for the loss.141 Even if the policyholder was unin-
sured for one or more of the eighteen years, there are many 
scenarios under which horizontal allocation would still result 
in a larger recovery. Thus, it is plainly inaccurate to character-
ize vertical allocation as universally “favoring” the policy-
holder. Which allocation method will favor the policyholder de-
pends entirely on the unique circumstances of a particular 
case. 
For single-vertical allocation, as long as the policyholder 
has enough insurance within a policy period, the insurers will 
have to bear the risk of any orphan share. However, the ques-
tion remains as to who among the insurers must bear that cost. 
Vertical allocation could draw an analogy from general 
CERCLA jurisprudence and mandate that the insurers in the 
targeted policy period be held jointly and severally liable up to 
their policy limits, with insurers from other policy periods only 
severally liable.142 Equally plausibly, each of the insurers could 
be held liable for an allocated portion of any orphan share. 
Thus far, vertical allocation theory is silent on this point. Be-
cause courts engaged in the allocation process are acting in eq-
uity, the second option is more appropriate. It is simply more 
logical to spread the orphan share burden equally across all 
triggered insurance policies, rather than permit orphan share 
 
(1998). 
 140. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1042 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 141. In fact, such a recovery under horizontal allocation would be exactly the sort 
of stacking of insurance coverage rejected in Keene. See id. 
 142. Such a method would be consistent with some strains of thought about 
CERCLA liability where under § 107 liability for direct defendants is joint and several, 
but liability for third-party defendants under § 113 is several. 
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liability to be controlled by the happenstance of which policy 
period is targeted in the first instance. 
B. Orphan Shares in Horizontal Allocation 
Horizontal allocation claims to avoid the orphan share prob-
lem entirely. Regardless of the reason for the lack of in-
surance, horizontal allocation would allocate the share for any 
periods without insurance entirely to the policyholder. In 
avoiding one set of problems, however, horizontal allocation ex-
changes it for another. What about orphan share due to insol-
vency, lost policies, or the complete unavailability of insurance? 
For straight-horizontal allocation, the answer is clear—the 
policyholder must bear a pro rata share for the periods in 
which it could not prove insurance coverage.143 Lost policies 
and insurer insolvency thus returned the transferred risk 
squarely to the insured. 
Weighted-horizontal allocation recognizes the serious ineq-
uities inherent to this approach and suggests a reluctance to 
assign policyholders the risk of any and all orphan shares.144 
Rather than resolving the question, however, weighted-
horizontal “puts aside” the question and never returns to it, 
thus providing no guidance.145 But, if horizontal allocation is 
really about segregating those risks that the policyholder 
transferred from those risks that the policyholder chose to 
bear, any periods of insurer insolvency, or any lost policies pre-
sent a tremendous dilemma. The policyholder did not elect to 
“go bare” during those policy periods, yet is allocated a share of 
liability anyway. 
One possible solution to this troubling orphan share issue 
in horizontal allocation would be to segregate different kinds of 
orphan shares. Orphan shares created by a failure to purchase 
insurance would be considered risks retained by the policy-
holder. Under horizontal allocation, there is no equitable bar to 
assigning those shares to the policyholder. The remaining or-
 
 143. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 
1212, 1224 (6th Cir. 1980), reh’g granted, in part, clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 
1981). 
 144. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (N.J. 1994); 
Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1200-03 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
 145. See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 993 (“[P]ut[] aside for a moment the problem 
of periods of self-insurance.”). 
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phan shares, arising from liability that would otherwise be al-
located to an insolvent insurer, or to a lost policy, could then be 
evenly divided among all triggered policies. Under this pro-
posal, horizontal allocation would spread the risk of insurer in-
solvency to the solvent insurers but would not similarly spread 
the risk of failure to purchase insurance. Although this is slip-
pery ground, the logic behind horizontal allocation can support 
such a result. The rationale for the distinction is clear: respect 
the risk that was transferred, but require policyholders to in-
ternalize any risk they did not transfer.146 Such a result re-
quires partial abandonment of horizontal allocation’s “during 
the policy period” reasoning, but may be justifiable in light of 
the indisputable facts that the insurance industry acted as a 
unified whole in drafting and promoting CGL policies and that 
each insurer did agree to the risk of paying its full policy limits. 
Because weighted-horizontal allocation already relies on a spe-
cial master to perform the necessary allocations, this additional 
calculation could be incorporated into the horizontal allocation 
process without much effort. 
An even larger conceptual problem for horizontal allocation 
is the fate of those years since adoption of the absolute pollu-
tion exclusion in 1986. As time drags on, the number of years 
since all CGL policies included this language increases. If hori-
zontal allocation is applied literally, the policyholder’s coverage 
must shrink every year as the ratio of insured to uninsured 
years decreases. At some point, the passage of time alone 
would decrease this ratio to the point that coverage under the 
policies would be illusory. 
 For example, if a suit were filed in 1996 claiming a continu-
ous environmental injury dating back to 1966, any insurance 
coverage for the last ten years of that period, one-third of the 
continuous injury, would contain an absolute pollution exclu-
sion. If a court employed horizontal allocation, and included the 
1986-1996 time period in the calculation, the most the policy-
holder could recover, regardless of years of coverage or of policy 
limits, would be two-thirds of the loss. By contrast, a policy-
holder that suffered an identical injury but discovered the 
 
 146. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1204 (“Moreover, we note that judges who have en-
dorsed proration-to-the-insured have done so only to oblige a manufacturer to accept a 
proportionate share of a risk that it elected to assume, either by declining to purchase 
available insurance or by purchasing what turned out to be an insufficient amount of 
insurance.”). 
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problem in 1986 would be fully covered. And pity the poor poli-
cyholder who does not discover the same injury until 2006; its 
maximum potential recovery would be reduced even further. In 
all three cases, the injury is identical, and the policies from 
1966 through 1985 are triggered and liable. But the insurance 
industry’s 1986 decision to include an absolute pollution exclu-
sion will reduce, year by year, the coverage available under the 
earlier policies. Such progressively disappearing coverage could 
not possibly be consistent with the reasonable expectations of 
either the insurer or the policyholder.147 
This critique highlights a major contradiction inherent to 
horizontal allocation. In adopting the continuous trigger rule, 
courts were addressing the insurers’ argument that policyhold-
ers could not establish actual injury during the policy period 
and thus were failing to establish that a policy had been trig-
gered at all. The continuous trigger rule responded to this ar-
gument by concluding that where a long-tail injury occurred, 
but the parties could not segregate discrete injuries in any 
meaningful fashion, all policy periods between exposure and 
the claim were presumed triggered. When environmental con-
tamination arises from discrete and identifiable events, then 
the actual injury trigger requires those policies on the risk at 
the time of the injury to pay “all sums” for property damages, 
up to their policy limits.148 If that same injury continues unde-
tected for a period of years, however, it would become a long-
tail injury subject to horizontal allocation. Under this latter 
scenario, the insurers’ liability would automatically convert 
from “all sums” coverage to a pro-rata share of the loss. But 
each policy has a separate and independent obligation to in-
demnify the policyholder. There is no obvious reason to permit 
the event that triggers coverage to define the extent of cover-
age. By importing the continuous trigger notion into the alloca-
tion process, horizontal allocation curtails each insurer’s liabil-
ity to its policyholder simply because a long-tail injury occurs 
continuously over time and thereby implicates other insurance 
policies. 
 
 147. See id. at 1203 (“[W]e do not agree with the District Judge’s subsidiary ruling 
that proration-to-the-insured should be applied to the years after 1985 when asbestos 
liability insurance was no longer available.”). This logic applies at least as forcefully to 
the situation in which there is an orphan share based on insurer insolvency. 
 148. See, e.g., Dotmar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 733-34 
(Minn. 1997). 
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Such an allocation is necessarily based on the conclusion 
that discrete injuries occurred in each policy period—a direct 
contradiction of the logic underlying the continuous trigger rule 
in the first place. 
Were this just a matter of intellectual consistency, the con-
tradiction might be of small moment. Unfortunately, the real 
world reverberations of this contradiction are extremely power-
ful. By reading the continuous trigger into the allocation proc-
ess, horizontal allocation permits the insurance industry, 
through its subsequent decision not to offer environmental cov-
erage, to retrospectively reduce the nature and extent of liabil-
ity under these triggered policies. Such an approach makes a 
policyholder’s coverage contingent on an insurer’s decision not 
to later change the coverage provision. A rule that reduces or 
deprives an insured of previously purchased coverage is not 
only contrary to the basic cannons of contract law but also ex-
pressly contradicts ISO representations in 1986 that the new 
CGL policies would not affect the operation of previously-issued 
policies.149 
Some jurisdictions escape this conundrum by drawing from 
vertical allocation and simply dropping years after addition of 
the absolute pollution exclusion from the allocation calculation. 
These jurisdictions limit any allocation to years “that would be 
triggered if a policy were applicable in that year.”150 Such an 
approach relies on the notion that policies containing an abso-
lute pollution exclusion could not have been triggered by a 
long-tail injury. Like the insurer insolvency issue addressed 
above, this approach tempers horizontal allocation’s focus on 
“during the policy period” and instead emphasizes the dis-
tinction between a failure to purchase available insurance and 
the unavailability of environmental insurance after a certain 
date.151 In an extremely powerful dissent, however, Justices 
 
 149. See James F. Hogg, The Tale of a Tail, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515 (1998) 
(describing ISO representations); see also, Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 104 (recognizing that 
policyholders did not “bargain away” asbestos coverage but rather had no voice in the 
insurer decision to eliminate this coverage). 
 150. American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 
256 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 995 (“When periods of no 
insurance reflect a decision by an actor to assume or retain a risk, as opposed to peri-
ods when coverage for a risk is not available, to expect the risk-bearer to share in the 
allocation is reasonable.”). 
 151. Stonewall rejected proration-to-the-insured for those years in which insur-
ance was not available due to a coverage exclusion. 
BRAT-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:22 AM 
1215] APPORTIONING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 1263 
Madsen, Alexander, Sanders and Chief Justice Durham of the 
Washington Supreme Court argue that this distinction be-
tween self-insurance by affirmative decision and self-insurance 
where coverage is not available is contrary to the root principle 
of horizontal allocation. 152 The justices suggest that the reason 
for a failure to insure is irrelevant and that consideration of in-
surance availability cannot be reconciled with the bedrock 
horizontal principle that each policy provides coverage only for 
injuries that occur “during the policy period.” 
V. CONCLUSION 
In an ideal world, all jurisdictions would agree on one allo-
cation method to be employed in every long-tail insurance case. 
This article suggests that the method should be what I have 
termed single-vertical allocation followed by “time-on-the-risk” 
secondary apportionment. For jurisdictions that have yet to  
decide this issue, this suggested method holds out the promise 
of consistent and equitable results that carefully balance the 
competing policy concerns implicated by long-tail environ-
mental insurance claims. Not only does this method make 
sense of the law and of the underlying social questions, but it 
also streamlines litigation. Parties will be able to calculate 
their likely allotted shares and settle accordingly, thereby spar-
ing themselves and the judicial system protracted litigation.153 
Because insurance questions are a matter of state law, and 
various state supreme courts have already adopted horizontal 
allocation, total unanimity on this point is unlikely in the near 
future. Under a second-best approach, horizontal jurisdictions 
can standardize and rationalize their allocation process. Done 
in the most reasonable manner, horizontal allocation involves 
weighted-primary allocation followed by “fill-the-glass” secon-
dary apportionment. If horizontal jurisdictions additionally 
elect to exclude orphan shares created by the absolute pollution 
 
 152. See B & L Trucking, 951 P.2d 250, 260 n.10 (“While some courts distinguish 
those cases where the insured has affirmatively elected self-insurance (going bare) 
from those where, for example, coverage is not available, in either case, the insurer 
which has contracted to provide coverage for insured periods has not contracted to pro-
vide coverage for damage outside the policy period.”) (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
 153. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shad-
ows of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (describing the law as 
providing a framework within which parties bargain to privately order their respective 
rights). 
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exclusion or by insurer insolvency from the shares of liability 
prorated to the policyholder, such a decision would go a long 
way towards minimizing the otherwise troubling weaknesses 
inherent to horizontal allocation. 
 
